Press Room

With the arrival of the second Trump administration, great power competition is at an inflection point. Both Russia and China face internal crises that compel them to engage with the United States. To increase their leverage, Beijing and Moscow are attempting to coordinate their efforts. However, their ability to support each other is severely limited, giving the U.S. considerable room to maneuver. In recent days, the leaders of the world’s three great powers have engaged in a flurry of diplomacy. A few days before his inauguration, Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a phone call that both sides described as positive. Then, hours after taking the oath of office, Trump told reporters that Russian President Vladimir Putin was “destroying Russia by not making a deal [on Ukraine]” and that Russia was “in big trouble” given the state of its economy. Finally, on Jan. 22, Putin held a 95-minute video call with Xi, during which they discussed their interactions with the new Trump administration. World leaders are typically quick to engage any new administration in Washington, although it’s uncommon for these interactions to occur even before the inauguration. However, this moment is different for two key reasons. First, Trump’s political comeback heralds a campaign to reshape the U.S. political system and overhaul U.S. foreign policy. Second, the world is beset by a level of crisis not seen since World War II. The United States is managing two wars – in Europe and the Middle East – while confronting the potential for a third in East Asia. China’s economy is in steep decline, forcing Beijing to focus on stabilization. And Russia needs a resolution to its extremely costly war against Ukraine. In essence, all three powers are under immense pressure to deescalate and stabilize their geopolitical positions. The common thread for China and Russia is that they both need to make a deal with the U.S. to solve their respective crises. Each recognizes the limits of what the other can do to help. Beijing is not in a position to aid Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine, while the Kremlin cannot help the Chinese Communist Party fix its economic problems – which are increasingly becoming political in nature. Both see their best paths forward as reaching agreements with Washington. Russia hopes to leverage Trump’s pledge to end “forever wars” and his proclivity for dealmaking to retain as much Ukrainian territory as possible after nearly three years of conflict. Similarly, Xi hopes to convince Trump to offer some relief from U.S. restrictions on trade, technology and investment, which could help stabilize China’s faltering economy. Though in some ways the second Trump administration presents opportunities for both China and Russia, Trump’s unpredictability and the looming threat of punitive measures mean that bargaining will be difficult, to say the least. This uncertainty was underscored by Sergei Ryabkov, the Kremlin’s top official for arms control and relations with the U.S., who warned on Jan. 22 that the window for a deal is narrow and that Moscow lacks clarity on Washington’s intentions. Similarly, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng acknowledged after meeting with his U.S. counterpart, JD Vance, that while there is potential for cooperation, significant disagreements remain. The lengthy video call between Xi and Putin signals a recognition of their shared reality. The leaders are said to have compared notes on how they see the U.S. behaving in this new era. But setting aside their tireless rhetoric about their strong bilateral friendship, both leaders are wary that a deal between one of them and Washington could harm the other’s interests. Therefore, in addition to coordination, their call was also intended to assess how far the other was willing to compromise. From the U.S. perspective, negotiations with Russia have a clearer path, given Washington’s interest in ending the Russia-Ukraine war. The key question is how much of Ukraine’s territory Washington is willing to let Moscow retain in a ceasefire. Talks with China are far less straightforward due to the complexities of the geoeconomic relationship. In both cases, however, Washington holds significant leverage, knowing that both Beijing and Moscow have no choice but to engage.

Editor’s note: If it feels as though the world is changing, that’s because it is. Global economic reconfiguration, demographic decline and geopolitical realignment have fundamentally altered long-held conventional political wisdom, perhaps nowhere more markedly than in the United States. Like all countries, the U.S. is mutable. But unlike most others, changes there have global consequences. The situation in America signals a break in the natural process of a country. America has surprised the world many times, and it is doing so again. The following essay is the third in a series by George Friedman seeking to explain why that’s the case. Though U.S.-China naval tensions are by no means a new development, they are vital to any understanding of American behavior on the global stage. Partly this is because the United States is one of the most well-protected countries in the world. It is situated firmly in the middle of North America – a vast landmass buttressed by oceans – and, as such, cannot be readily attacked from the ground. The northern approach to the United States is from Canada, and the southern approach is from Mexico. Neither has the social or military power to invade the United States. The biggest threats to America have always come from the seas. U.S. intervention in both world wars was designed to block Germany from building a fleet that could threaten U.S. maritime power (as the U-boats had in both conflicts). During World War II, the naval effort dwarfed the ground effort until the war was well underway. But the invasion of Europe and the isolation of Japan were both naval actions. China’s geography differs dramatically. Its east coast, large though it may be, is hemmed in by island chains. These chains, which include sovereign states as well as disputed territories, are a blessing and a curse: They can hinder the maritime trade on which China’s economy relies, but they can also, if prepared and powered sufficiently, interdict U.S. naval forces, even to the point of controlling the seas between China and the United States. Washington’s fundamental interest is preventing this from happening, so it has developed the capability to deploy fleets to block China’s access to the sea. So far, this limited action has satisfied U.S. interests; the Chinese navy has not sortied en masse to challenge the U.S., and U.S. allies, particularly Australia, strengthen its position in the South China Sea. Even so, as was the case in both world wars, the ability to hold the Pacific is critical. (It was Japan’s attempts to employ this same strategy that led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor.)

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Beijing naturally feels threatened by U.S. naval power because the United States has the ability to interdict and close Chinese shipping. And because China’s economy is fueled by exports, the threat of interdiction is perhaps the single most animating factor in its strategic policy. Beijing must mitigate the threat by forcing the U.S. Navy back into the Pacific, if not farther. So far, these threats have not amounted to physical conflict. China has been cautious in challenging the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Navy is cautious in not forcing China’s hand. To be sure, focusing solely on naval warfare ignores the threats that nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction pose. But the nuclear threat is limited by the principle of mutual assured destruction, and the other, advanced technological threats have not yet materialized on a large enough scale to endanger a continental power. So at this time, the balance of power in the Pacific between U.S. and Chinese naval forces remains key to American hegemony and the alliance that upholds it. In the event of war, the more extreme and technological threats remain secondary to the conventional naval threat the U.S. poses to China and China poses to the U.S. It would be wise to remember this as the Chinese navy develops and as the U.S. Navy potentially weakens. Though U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term is officially only two days old, it seems as though he wants to maintain some elasticity in his foreign policy – which makes sense. But at some point, he will find himself focused on direct threats, however distant, that will require more rigid responses. U.S.-China relations frequently revolve around marginal issues because neither side is spoiling for a fight. U.S. policy must focus on maintaining that balance.