Editor’s note: If it feels as though the world is changing, that’s because it is. Global economic reconfiguration, demographic decline and geopolitical realignment have fundamentally altered long-held conventional political wisdom, perhaps nowhere more markedly than in the United States. Like all countries, the U.S. is mutable. But unlike most others, changes there have global consequences. The situation in America signals a break in the natural process of a country. America has surprised the world many times, and it is doing so again. The following essay is the third in a series by George Friedman seeking to explain why that’s the case.
Though U.S.-China naval tensions are by no means a new development, they are vital to any understanding of American behavior on the global stage.
Partly this is because the United States is one of the most well-protected countries in the world. It is situated firmly in the middle of North America – a vast landmass buttressed by oceans – and, as such, cannot be readily attacked from the ground. The northern approach to the United States is from Canada, and the southern approach is from Mexico. Neither has the social or military power to invade the United States. The biggest threats to America have always come from the seas. U.S. intervention in both world wars was designed to block Germany from building a fleet that could threaten U.S. maritime power (as the U-boats had in both conflicts). During World War II, the naval effort dwarfed the ground effort until the war was well underway. But the invasion of Europe and the isolation of Japan were both naval actions.
China’s geography differs dramatically. Its east coast, large though it may be, is hemmed in by island chains. These chains, which include sovereign states as well as disputed territories, are a blessing and a curse: They can hinder the maritime trade on which China’s economy relies, but they can also, if prepared and powered sufficiently, interdict U.S. naval forces, even to the point of controlling the seas between China and the United States. Washington’s fundamental interest is preventing this from happening, so it has developed the capability to deploy fleets to block China’s access to the sea. So far, this limited action has satisfied U.S. interests; the Chinese navy has not sortied en masse to challenge the U.S., and U.S. allies, particularly Australia, strengthen its position in the South China Sea. Even so, as was the case in both world wars, the ability to hold the Pacific is critical. (It was Japan’s attempts to employ this same strategy that led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor.)
Beijing naturally feels threatened by U.S. naval power because the United States has the ability to interdict and close Chinese shipping. And because China’s economy is fueled by exports, the threat of interdiction is perhaps the single most animating factor in its strategic policy. Beijing must mitigate the threat by forcing the U.S. Navy back into the Pacific, if not farther. So far, these threats have not amounted to physical conflict. China has been cautious in challenging the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Navy is cautious in not forcing China’s hand.
To be sure, focusing solely on naval warfare ignores the threats that nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction pose. But the nuclear threat is limited by the principle of mutual assured destruction, and the other, advanced technological threats have not yet materialized on a large enough scale to endanger a continental power. So at this time, the balance of power in the Pacific between U.S. and Chinese naval forces remains key to American hegemony and the alliance that upholds it. In the event of war, the more extreme and technological threats remain secondary to the conventional naval threat the U.S. poses to China and China poses to the U.S. It would be wise to remember this as the Chinese navy develops and as the U.S. Navy potentially weakens.
Though U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term is officially only two days old, it seems as though he wants to maintain some elasticity in his foreign policy – which makes sense. But at some point, he will find himself focused on direct threats, however distant, that will require more rigid responses. U.S.-China relations frequently revolve around marginal issues because neither side is spoiling for a fight. U.S. policy must focus on maintaining that balance.
The Geopolitics of the American President