On Sunday, The New York Times published an article so long and so significant that it merits unpacking here. Its author, Times investigative reporter Adam Entous, claims to have interviewed many sources in various countries who revealed the extent of Washington’s involvement in the Ukraine war and, in doing so, provides an answer to the question of how Russia was unable to win it. Entous had to have spoken with people with a high clearance to obtain this information. It was published in the NYT because it was the one newspaper the Russians would certainly check. The story was quickly translated into Russian and published in a Russian newspaper, essentially acknowledging its receipt. Details, after all, can redefine the understanding of a war.
There are plenty of examples to choose from. One section of the story explains that the U.S. sent intelligence to Ukrainian forces to target Russian positions and attacks, via a U.S. base in Germany. Another section details why Russia’s various offensives failed and why it was forced to abandon its assault on Kyiv.
The heart of the article, however, concerned U.S. weaponry. Rather than reveal radical new technologies, it instead explained the manner in which the systems worked together under a high degree of American control to fight the Russians to a stalemate, if not to defeat. The most important weapon used was a satellite system so refined that it could identify the presence of relatively small Russian units. The U.S. supplied artillery – including the HIMARS short-range rocket system, a truck-based launcher with precision guidance capabilities – that was apparently linked in some manner to downloaded satellite data. According to the article, senior officers from the U.S., Canada and Britain provided strategic guidance and coordinated with the Ukrainian high command, while high-ranking U.S. officers oversaw the field operations and were in practical control of the weapons. Most importantly, the weapons were used at the command level.
Intelligence was fed to the Americans, who oversaw the linkage to the satellite data and provided targeting information to Ukraine. Ukrainian soldiers could not even fire a missile without a U.S. officer first slipping in a special card to the HIMARS system. Given the accuracy and acuity of the satellites, these rockets were vital in reversing Russian attacks on Kyiv early in the war. Coupled with pervasive failures in Russian logistics, it’s easy to see why Russian President Vladimir Putin was forced to claim he wanted only a small portion of Ukraine.
Indeed, the most startling revelation to me was not that the Russians failed in the war, nor that the Americans were providing massive aid, nor that the HIMARS was such a capable weapon. It was that satellites had reached a level of such sophistication and acuity that they were useful in tactical warfare. They could, for example, capture small unit formations with their cameras, and downlink so efficiently to the weapon that the time of engagement was a tactical, not strategic, matter.
This, the article says, clarifies why Russia at one point threatened to use tactical nuclear missiles: It was the only option Moscow had for suppressing the HIMARS. The Russian military lacked the precision that allowed conventional explosives to destroy small but dangerous formations. Tactical nukes have a large kill zone that does not require high levels of precision. Whether or not Russia believed tactical nukes were its only option, it nevertheless threatened to use them in the hopes of forcing the U.S. to stop its bombardment. According to the article, the CIA calculated only a 5-10 percent chance of Russia making good on its threat – that is, until later, when Russia believed its southern positions could have been threatened, at which point the probability rose to 50 percent. (It’s unclear to me why the CIA uses percentages when the answers “not likely” and “I don’t know” would have been more honest.) In any case, Moscow was unsure whether Washington would retaliate in kind, and so it refrained from using tactical nukes.
Elsewhere, the article notes that the U.S. disallowed the Ukrainians from advancing deep into Russian-held territory, having no desire to force Russia into extreme actions or risk capture of the weapons they were using. This upset the Ukrainian command, which wanted to continue to attack. Clearly, the U.S. was in control, which thus explains the state of play with regard to negotiations.
Moscow obviously knew of the weapons and of their own vulnerability to them. This raises the question of why it continued to prosecute the war. The only explanation I can find is that Putin hoped Joe Biden, under whom U.S. war plans were crafted, would lose the election and Donald Trump would halt operations. He bet that Trump wanted peace more than he (Putin) did. Trump’s response was to have this article released. An article like this contains so much highly classified information that the author is legally bound to release only what is agreed to, and when. That it was published so quickly – just in time for the hard part of the negotiations – is telling.
This puts Putin in a bind domestically. Instead of prudently ending the war in the face of nearly insurmountable adversity, Putin continued to wage it. More, he framed the war as a fight between Russia and the West. Given Russia’s limits and America’s capabilities, a truce might have been prudent. Now, Putin wants to talk.
Before ending this, I would like to honor the Ukrainian and Russian soldiers who died for their countries. This conflict will dramatically change the nature of war on land. But in the end, it will be the poor bloody infantry that will pay the price. Why Russia chose to fight an unwinnable war isn’t clear, and it is for the Russian people to consider. But the one thing I am absolutely certain of is that this is not the last war mankind will fight.
America in Transition &