Do the New Missiles in Ukraine Matter?

Itā€™s an escalatory move, but they arenā€™t the game-changer many have made them out to be.

2724

By Andrew Davidson

On Nov. 17, the United States greenlit the use of Army Tactical Missile Systems in Ukraine. The stipulations of use and number of systems deployed is not yet clear, but hereā€™s what we know: ATACMS are solid-fueled surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles). When fired, they take a high atmospheric path and fall at a steep angle. They have a capable payload of 225 kilograms (500 pounds) of explosives or cluster munitions, they can be used against wide-area and lightly armored targets, and they have a circular error probability of 9 meters (about 30 feet).

In laymanā€™s terms, this means Ukraine now has the ability to strike much deeper into Russian territory than it previously could, with missiles that are difficult to intercept and that are extremely accurate at their maximum range.

Perhaps the introduction of ATACMS will change the geography of the battlefield. As many as 14 Russian airfields and launch sites now lie within their range, as do key points in Russian logistics, including equipment and troop staging areas and roads. All of the Kursk region of Russia is well within striking distance of Ukraineā€™s new missiles. Russiaā€™s Ministry of Defense claims to have shot down five of them during a strike on Nov. 19.

But without knowing how many ATACMS have been deployed or the location of launch sites, itā€™s difficult to say how truly game-changing they are. Ukraine already has missiles that can strike farther than ATACMS, but it doesnā€™t produce enough of them to use in any scenario besides individual, pinpoint strikes. Russia, too, has the capability to hit targets throughout Ukraine ā€“ and has done so plenty of times ā€“ and yet the war continues apace. (This is to say nothing of the limitations of air power more broadly.)

The decision to use ATACMS does, however, open the door for more escalation. For starters, Moscow has responded by finalizing an updated nuclear doctrine, which lowers the threshold for a nuclear strike to include a conventional attack against Russia that poses a ā€œcritical threatā€ to its territorial integrity or sovereignty. This includes damage to vital government and military facilities whose incapacitation would disrupt Russiaā€™s nuclear forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin has also said the decision brings the West directly into the Ukraine conflict. Thatā€™s not to say that ATACMS will bring about nuclear holocaust, of course, but they narrow the margin for error in a war against a nuclear power.

Notably, the Biden administration authorized the use of ATACMS against Russian territory in the final months of its tenure. Itā€™s unlikely the decision by itself will affect any peace plan proposed by President-elect Donald Trump, who has yet to make a statement on the conflict, now in its 1,000th day.

Andrew Davidson is currently an intern at GPF and completing a masterā€™s degree in international relations. Prior to GPF, he served in the U.S. Army for 11 years.

Geopolitical Futures
Geopolitical Futures (GPF) was founded in 2015 by George Friedman, international strategist and author of The Storm Before the Calm and The Next 100 Years. GPF is non-ideological, analyzes the world and forecasts the future using geopolitics: political, economic, military and geographic dimensions at the foundation of a nation.