Press Room

Geopolitical Futures LLC, the forecasting company led by internationally renowned geopolitical strategist and best-selling author George Friedman, is pleased to announce that János Zoltán Csák is joining the company as a Partner. Mr Csák brings a wealth of experience in business, government and academia. Founder and Chairman George Friedman, said, “I am delighted to welcome János as a partner with his experience spanning various industry and financial sectors and multiple geographic regions. We consider it a privilege to have János join our team in this role and look forward to many innovative ideas and plans we want to implement with his support.” Mr Csák’s corporate experience includes his former positions of chairman of T-Mobile Hungary; chairman of MOL Group, the Hungarian oil and gas company; senior treasury advisor at Ameritech Corporation (Chicago, USA); executive board member of Creditanstalt Investment Bank (CA-IB) in Vienna, and member of the board of directors of Bank of China in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition Mr Csák has served as non-executive board member in companies in North America and Australia. In his government roles Mr Csák served as Minister of Culture and Innovation of Hungary (2022-2024) and Hungarian Ambassador to the United Kingdom (2011-2014). He is also an author and translator of books and essays on philosophy and economics and published “The Genius of America” in the United States in April 2024, for which George Friedman wrote the Foreward. Mr Csak earned his MA in Finance and Sociology at Corvinus University in 1987, completed the Executive Program of the University of Michigan Business School in 1996, and the Challenge of Leadership Program of INSEAD business school in France in 2000. Commenting on joining Geopolitical Futures, Mr. Csák said, “It is an honor to join GPF the renowned thought leader in geopolitics and geoeconomics. I am confident that our friendship and mutual respect with George and Meredith Friedman and my experience and networks provide a strong basis and opportunity to open new horizons deep and far.”

Geopolitical Futures® (GPF), the forecasting company led by internationally renowned geopolitical strategist and best selling author George Friedman, has introduced a new product that provides actionable economic intelligence for businesses and investors. GeoEconomic Lens views a nation’s economy through the perspective of geopolitics to examine and predict the impact on trade routes, energy alliances and prices, financial power, transportation, supply chains, logistics and international industries. Using our unique method and model, Lens helps you understand not just what is happening but how global power dynamics shape economic stability, dependency, and opportunity. As outlined by GPF’s Chief Geoeconomist, Antonia Colibasanu, “Our geopolitical model is a flywheel for economic risk analysis others miss. Knowing what to expect geopolitically allows us to study and predict the economic consequences and the future of these sectors.” Each month GeoEconomic Lens covers global, regional and sectoral economic issues in depth, with mid-month updates and the ability to contact an analyst for a more customized product. “As we do for Geopolitical Futures, our new focus on the economic indicators of a nation’s power will be presented with the accessible style we are known for, analyzing and forecasting complex concepts in a way that is easy to understand. GeoEconomic Lens is particularly valuable for busy executives, companies and investors as well as for those wanting to better understand the forces driving a nation’s economy,” said George Friedman, founder and chairman. Receive via email the FREE pdf of the inaugural issue (May 2026) of GeoEconomic Lens at: https://geopoliticalfutures.com/introducing-lens/

With the arrival of the second Trump administration, great power competition is at an inflection point. Both Russia and China face internal crises that compel them to engage with the United States. To increase their leverage, Beijing and Moscow are attempting to coordinate their efforts. However, their ability to support each other is severely limited, giving the U.S. considerable room to maneuver. In recent days, the leaders of the world’s three great powers have engaged in a flurry of diplomacy. A few days before his inauguration, Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a phone call that both sides described as positive. Then, hours after taking the oath of office, Trump told reporters that Russian President Vladimir Putin was “destroying Russia by not making a deal [on Ukraine]” and that Russia was “in big trouble” given the state of its economy. Finally, on Jan. 22, Putin held a 95-minute video call with Xi, during which they discussed their interactions with the new Trump administration. World leaders are typically quick to engage any new administration in Washington, although it’s uncommon for these interactions to occur even before the inauguration. However, this moment is different for two key reasons. First, Trump’s political comeback heralds a campaign to reshape the U.S. political system and overhaul U.S. foreign policy. Second, the world is beset by a level of crisis not seen since World War II. The United States is managing two wars – in Europe and the Middle East – while confronting the potential for a third in East Asia. China’s economy is in steep decline, forcing Beijing to focus on stabilization. And Russia needs a resolution to its extremely costly war against Ukraine. In essence, all three powers are under immense pressure to deescalate and stabilize their geopolitical positions. The common thread for China and Russia is that they both need to make a deal with the U.S. to solve their respective crises. Each recognizes the limits of what the other can do to help. Beijing is not in a position to aid Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine, while the Kremlin cannot help the Chinese Communist Party fix its economic problems – which are increasingly becoming political in nature. Both see their best paths forward as reaching agreements with Washington. Russia hopes to leverage Trump’s pledge to end “forever wars” and his proclivity for dealmaking to retain as much Ukrainian territory as possible after nearly three years of conflict. Similarly, Xi hopes to convince Trump to offer some relief from U.S. restrictions on trade, technology and investment, which could help stabilize China’s faltering economy. Though in some ways the second Trump administration presents opportunities for both China and Russia, Trump’s unpredictability and the looming threat of punitive measures mean that bargaining will be difficult, to say the least. This uncertainty was underscored by Sergei Ryabkov, the Kremlin’s top official for arms control and relations with the U.S., who warned on Jan. 22 that the window for a deal is narrow and that Moscow lacks clarity on Washington’s intentions. Similarly, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng acknowledged after meeting with his U.S. counterpart, JD Vance, that while there is potential for cooperation, significant disagreements remain. The lengthy video call between Xi and Putin signals a recognition of their shared reality. The leaders are said to have compared notes on how they see the U.S. behaving in this new era. But setting aside their tireless rhetoric about their strong bilateral friendship, both leaders are wary that a deal between one of them and Washington could harm the other’s interests. Therefore, in addition to coordination, their call was also intended to assess how far the other was willing to compromise. From the U.S. perspective, negotiations with Russia have a clearer path, given Washington’s interest in ending the Russia-Ukraine war. The key question is how much of Ukraine’s territory Washington is willing to let Moscow retain in a ceasefire. Talks with China are far less straightforward due to the complexities of the geoeconomic relationship. In both cases, however, Washington holds significant leverage, knowing that both Beijing and Moscow have no choice but to engage.

Editor’s note: If it feels as though the world is changing, that’s because it is. Global economic reconfiguration, demographic decline and geopolitical realignment have fundamentally altered long-held conventional political wisdom, perhaps nowhere more markedly than in the United States. Like all countries, the U.S. is mutable. But unlike most others, changes there have global consequences. The situation in America signals a break in the natural process of a country. America has surprised the world many times, and it is doing so again. The following essay is the third in a series by George Friedman seeking to explain why that’s the case. Though U.S.-China naval tensions are by no means a new development, they are vital to any understanding of American behavior on the global stage. Partly this is because the United States is one of the most well-protected countries in the world. It is situated firmly in the middle of North America – a vast landmass buttressed by oceans – and, as such, cannot be readily attacked from the ground. The northern approach to the United States is from Canada, and the southern approach is from Mexico. Neither has the social or military power to invade the United States. The biggest threats to America have always come from the seas. U.S. intervention in both world wars was designed to block Germany from building a fleet that could threaten U.S. maritime power (as the U-boats had in both conflicts). During World War II, the naval effort dwarfed the ground effort until the war was well underway. But the invasion of Europe and the isolation of Japan were both naval actions. China’s geography differs dramatically. Its east coast, large though it may be, is hemmed in by island chains. These chains, which include sovereign states as well as disputed territories, are a blessing and a curse: They can hinder the maritime trade on which China’s economy relies, but they can also, if prepared and powered sufficiently, interdict U.S. naval forces, even to the point of controlling the seas between China and the United States. Washington’s fundamental interest is preventing this from happening, so it has developed the capability to deploy fleets to block China’s access to the sea. So far, this limited action has satisfied U.S. interests; the Chinese navy has not sortied en masse to challenge the U.S., and U.S. allies, particularly Australia, strengthen its position in the South China Sea. Even so, as was the case in both world wars, the ability to hold the Pacific is critical. (It was Japan’s attempts to employ this same strategy that led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor.)

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Beijing naturally feels threatened by U.S. naval power because the United States has the ability to interdict and close Chinese shipping. And because China’s economy is fueled by exports, the threat of interdiction is perhaps the single most animating factor in its strategic policy. Beijing must mitigate the threat by forcing the U.S. Navy back into the Pacific, if not farther. So far, these threats have not amounted to physical conflict. China has been cautious in challenging the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Navy is cautious in not forcing China’s hand. To be sure, focusing solely on naval warfare ignores the threats that nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction pose. But the nuclear threat is limited by the principle of mutual assured destruction, and the other, advanced technological threats have not yet materialized on a large enough scale to endanger a continental power. So at this time, the balance of power in the Pacific between U.S. and Chinese naval forces remains key to American hegemony and the alliance that upholds it. In the event of war, the more extreme and technological threats remain secondary to the conventional naval threat the U.S. poses to China and China poses to the U.S. It would be wise to remember this as the Chinese navy develops and as the U.S. Navy potentially weakens. Though U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term is officially only two days old, it seems as though he wants to maintain some elasticity in his foreign policy – which makes sense. But at some point, he will find himself focused on direct threats, however distant, that will require more rigid responses. U.S.-China relations frequently revolve around marginal issues because neither side is spoiling for a fight. U.S. policy must focus on maintaining that balance.

One of the most pressing geopolitical issues Europe faces is its evolving relationship with the United States. This relationship will be critical as Europe navigates a complex geopolitical landscape shaped by two interrelated dynamics, over which Europe itself has little control: Washington’s stance toward Russia, particularly with regard to the war in Ukraine, and the nature of U.S.-China relations. Together, these factors will significantly impact European stability, security and autonomy. To be sure, Europe has no shortage of challenges. There has been a marked increase in radical and populist political parties – right and left – that have aggravated an already fractured political landscape. Many of these groups have adopted a more conciliatory stance toward Russia, thus undermining collective efforts to maintain sanctions and to fully support Kyiv. Domestic criticism over Israel’s actions in Gaza remains, as does the general uncertainty surrounding the new balance of power in the Middle East. (The associated discontent over northbound migration is also a major source of concern.) And this is to say nothing of the instability in the European periphery – in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in Moldova, across the Mediterranean and elsewhere. In this politically charged environment, Europe faces mounting pressure to reconcile its internal instabilities with its external obligations. The interplay of rising populism, economic discontent and foreign policy challenges underscores the fragility of European unity. But the war in Ukraine stands alone in its ability to impact European politics, security and economic affairs. Yet it is the United States, not Europe itself, that seems to hold the keys to locking the conflict down. The level of U.S. commitment to Ukraine, then, will be a decisive factor in determining Europe’s strategic direction, especially as a new president takes office with a self-proclaimed mandate to end the war. Either way, the U.S. will have to deal with Russia. Russia’s strategic imperative in the conflict, however, is more than a matter of territorial ambition. Sure, controlling Ukrainian territory achieves certain tactical objectives, but they are secondary to the broader goal of limiting U.S. influence in Europe and expanding Russia's own. For Moscow, pushing the U.S. out of Europe would be a major geopolitical victory because it would allow Russia to better align the Continent’s security and political order with its interests. Winning the war in Ukraine would, in theory, contribute to this goal. The problem is that Russia has not won the war; if anything, it has been significantly weakened by it. Despite these challenges, Russia has shown a desire to discuss the stalemate directly with Washington. This is a deliberate strategy to bypass Ukraine and European powers. By sidelining them, Russia can undermine their agency and position itself as a primary negotiator on European security. This approach reflects its broader ambition of redefining power relations on the Continent, even as its current position remains compromised by its faltering campaign in Ukraine. For Europe, this adds another layer of complexity to its strategic calculations. European leaders must navigate not only the immediate challenges of supporting Ukraine and managing the fallout of the war but also the broader implications of Russia’s long-term objectives. The outcome of this dynamic – whether through negotiations or continued conflict – will significantly influence the balance of power in Europe and its relationship with both the U.S. and Russia. Meanwhile, the relationship between the U.S. and China looms large over Europe’s policy landscape. If tensions between the U.S. and China escalate – whether through economic decoupling, technological rivalry, or intensified security competition in the Indo-Pacific – Europe risks being caught in the geopolitical crossfire. Intensified U.S.-China tensions would not only strain European economies but also affect Sino-Russian relations and thus the outcome of the Ukraine war. The prospect is already casting a shadow over much of the Continent. Beijing’s strategic interest in Europe revolves around preserving its access to the EU’s common market, a critical pillar of its economic ambitions and global influence. This priority underpins China’s efforts to cultivate bilateral relationships with specific European member states in an effort to undermine EU unity and prevent collective action that might restrict its market access. By offering economic incentives such as investments and trade deals, China has successfully forged closer ties with countries such as Hungary, Greece and others that are strategically significant, economically, politically or otherwise. In simple terms, to weaken Europe's cohesion is to weaken its leverage in negotiations. At the same time, China has expanded its investments in European port infrastructure, including ports in countries that border the EU. These investments are part of a broader strategy to secure physical access to the European market and establish economic dependencies with peripheral states. By controlling key nodes in Europe’s supply chain, China can ensure it has uninterrupted access to trade and increase its political leverage over countries that benefit from Chinese investment. China’s positioning in the Ukraine war reflects this strategic calculus. By presenting itself as neutral, Beijing avoids alienating the EU. By maintaining ties with Russia, it hedges its bets while benefiting from Russia’s international isolation. This delicate approach is driven by the need to avoid secondary sanctions that could harm China’s economy, particularly as it anticipates the possibility of increased U.S. tariffs on its exports. Beijing’s overriding goal is to prevent a united Western front that could threaten its economic stability. As U.S.-China tensions escalate, Europe remains a key battleground for influence. China and Russia both rely on European disunity and fragmentation to advance their strategic objectives, recognizing that a divided Europe is less capable of collective action and more vulnerable to external influence. Russia exploits internal divisions through energy dependencies, information campaigns and direct political interference. China employs economic tools such as targeted investments, bilateral trade agreements and infrastructure projects to establish dependencies. Though their methods differ, they share a common goal: diminishing U.S. influence on the Continent, limiting NATO’s effectiveness and, ideally, reshaping Europe’s political and economic landscape to serve their own needs. This is why it’s so important to monitor U.S.-European relations going forward. While the trans-Atlantic partnership remains a cornerstone of European stability, there is increased recognition in Europe of the need to pursue greater self-reliance in areas such as defense, energy security and technological innovation. The degree to which Europe can do so – while consolidating its position and resisting external attempts to exploit its divisions – will determine whether it emerges as a more unified and independent actor on the global stage. And how the U.S. responds to these efforts – whether by reinforcing its commitment to European security or recalibrating its approach – will shape the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship and its role in countering the influence of external powers like China and Russia. In this way, the U.S.-European relationship will become as much a source of strength as it is a point of tension.