After the Fall of Assad, the Middle East Braces for Unrest

Regional stability will hinge on what happens next in Syria.

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Jubilant crowds in some of Syria’s biggest and most politically significant cities toppled statues of former President Hafez Assad over the past week, in a scene reminiscent of the toppling of statues of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in 2003. They were celebrating the sudden and stunning ouster of Assad’s son, Bashar Assad, after 24 years in power. But the fall of Bashar Assad will not bring peace and stability to Syria in the foreseeable future. The militant group that led the rebellion, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and its controversial leader, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, will struggle to convince Syrians, let alone the outside world, that they have abandoned their jihadist past. Though most Syrians are dedicated Muslims, they have little interest in religious dogma. There is little common ground among Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious groups, which will prevent agreement on the fundamentals of a future political system and national identity. Complicating the situation further, the country’s neighbors have set their sights on Syrian territory amid the growing uncertainty there.

The Assad Dynasty

The Assads ruled Syria for decades with an iron fist. Their repression of the Syrian people peaked after November 1970, when Hafez Assad carried out a military coup in which he overthrew his partner in power, Salah Jadid. Official propaganda called Assad the eternal leader, and statues of his image were erected in every city and town throughout the country. His exercise of absolute power and coercion of the Syrian people eventually led to the degradation of Syria’s state institutions. He projected an air of invincibility and permanency. His ability to provide essential welfare services to the Syrian people enabled him to use unprecedented repressive measures against those who opposed his rule – even though per capita income dropped from $1,470 in 1980 to $990 in 1990. The decline of the country’s material resources did not reduce the application of despotic measures against those who dared to challenge his domestic and foreign policies. Corruption, traditionally a common feature of Syria’s public institutions, escalated under Hafez’s reign. He accepted it as a form of patronage. When Hafez died in 2000, Bashar succeeded him at just 34 years of age, in violation of the Syrian constitution, which stipulated that the president should be no younger than 40 years old.

But the Assad dynasty was always bound to fall. Repressive regimes – especially if they are endemically corrupt and fail to provide adequate services to their people and adapt their political systems to changing domestic and external conditions – eventually decay and collapse, often suddenly and unexpectedly. Per capita income in Syria reached $1,500 on the eve of the 2011 uprising but declined to $745 in 2021, after the civil war took a heavy toll on the economy. Bashar Assad’s regime would have collapsed in 2015 were it not for the support of Russian airpower and Iranian proxies.

Al-Golani’s Rise

The insurgency that brought down Assad this past weekend was led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which many Western governments have designated a terrorist group. The head of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, has a long history of militancy. After joining al-Qaida, he participated in the fight against U.S. forces that invaded Iraq in 2003. He moved to Lebanon in 2006, where he supervised training for fighters for Jund al-Sham, a Salafist jihadi organization. He then returned to Iraq in 2008 to fight for the Islamic State group. The U.S. Army briefly arrested him, and following his release, he moved to Syria after the 2011 uprising against Assad. He established the transnational jihadi al-Nusra Front, focusing on Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

After Assad regained control of Aleppo in late 2016, al-Golani changed the name of the group to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. He settled in the province of Idlib and established the Syrian Salvation Government, abandoning the doctrine of transnational jihad to focus on Syria instead. He declared that his goal had shifted to eliminating the Assad regime and establishing Islamic rule in Syria, saying that his membership in al-Qaida and association with the Islamic State group were a thing of the past. He consolidated his authoritarian control over Idlib and marginalized other opposition groups, both religious and secular.

Heterogeneous Society

The recent developments shouldn’t be shocking considering Syria’s tumultuous past. After gaining independence in 1943, Syria became an arena of competition as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Britain wrestled for influence. Against all odds, Hafez Assad managed to make Syria a regional power, but Bashar, fearing that the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq would eventually lead to his own overthrow, aligned with Iran, which dominated Syria’s political system after the 2011 uprising.

Soon after the rebellion began last month, the Syrian regime’s demoralized forces, who had been fighting a war for more than 13 years, collapsed. The rebels decided to continue their offensive after capturing Aleppo, seizing Hama despite heavy Russian air raids, and moved south to Homs, which they took without a fight. Members of the Druze religious sect in Sweida province launched a separate campaign, which led regime officials to flee without much resistance. The rebels there carried the five-color Druze flag, rather than the flag of the Syrian uprising. In Daraa, the site of the 2011 protests that launched the civil war, other rebel factions seized the area that straddled the borders with Israel and Jordan following the army’s withdrawal.

Syria | States of the French Mandate, 1921-1922
(click to enlarge)

Rebel forces in Daraa who operate under a different command reached Damascus as al-Golani’s battalions were still clearing Homs of regime forces. As the rebels continued their offensive, they avoided venturing into the Alawite-held coast, the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region called Rojava or the Druze majority Sweida province. Despite al-Golani’s statements that he wants to unite Syria, the country’s political landscape is highly polarized, and the factions that overthrew Assad’s regime will likely soon splinter and fight among themselves.

Meanwhile, an arson attack in Damascus’ central military intelligence building, perpetrated by former regime operatives masquerading as rebels, destroyed vital documents implicating the regime in the killing of thousands of activists during the country’s 13-year civil war. Assad succeeded in suppressing the 2011 uprising by arresting more than 200,000 Syrians in the years that followed, and the fate of many of the detainees remains unknown. Over the past week, the rebels have released many inmates from the country’s prisons, but most of those let loose were ordinary criminals. Observers widely believe that Assad’s regime had already liquidated most political prisoners. Now that their relatives are aware of their fates, it’s doubtful that al-Golani can fulfill his promise that the opposition will not seek revenge.

Implications for the Region

Syria’s neighbors will most likely take advantage of the fluid political and security situation there. Just a few hours after the fall of the regime, the Israeli army captured the Syrian side of Mount Hermon. It told the inhabitants of five villages near the 1974 ceasefire line to stay home or evacuate because of possible fighting. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the region and announced that the 1974 agreement that forced Israel to withdraw troops from the region was no longer relevant. The Israeli air force raided several military sites in Greater Damascus, allegedly because they contained strategic military assets. In the north, the Turkish air force bombed Kurdish positions amid reports that fighting had flared up again.

It’s very likely that the instability, chaos and absence of order in the country will continue for a long time, threatening Syria’s neighbors, especially Jordan, which shares a 200-mile (320-kilometer) border with Syria. The Jordanian army is monitoring events closely. Jordan fears that the situation will evolve into something similar to the chaos in Libya, if not worse.

Jordan has for years complained about the Syrian regime’s involvement in the illicit smuggling into its territory of Captagon, a cheap and highly addictive amphetamine. Production plants in Syria are still in business, and the trade is likely to resume with other manufacturers. In addition, Syria’s Daraa province, which neighbors Jordan, could become a battleground between competing armed factions and the close-knit Druze in next door Sweida province, with the fighting potentially spilling over into Jordan. King Abdullah II is aware of Israel’s likely plan to annex the West Bank after U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January, which could lead many Palestinians to flee to Jordan. Given the king’s opposition to such a move, Jordan might receive the go-ahead from the Trump administration to annex a part of Syria, namely Damascus and the country’s southwest territory that borders Jordan. The Hashemites in Jordan have always wanted Damascus to become the capital of their kingdom because their ancestors established the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750) there. They view Damascus as the jewel of the Hashemite crown.

The demise of Assad’s regime might also inspire militant groups in other Arab countries. Lebanese Christians and Sunni Muslims, for example, could try to disarm Hezbollah, which has already received a stunning blow by Israel, threatening to drag Lebanon into a renewed wave of sectarian conflict. Christians who have insisted on introducing a federalist system in Lebanon will become more vociferous in their demands. In Iraq, Assad’s overthrow might renew the hopes of anti-government protesters, whose movement was crushed in 2019 by Iranian-backed militias. And in Egypt, President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, who staged a 2013 coup that ended the Muslim Brotherhood’s control of Egyptian politics, also has reason to worry. The Arab region is bracing for unrest as it witnesses the dramatic developments in Syria. The country’s turmoil often reverberates across the Middle East, so regional stability will hinge on what happens there next.

Hilal Khashan
Hilal Khashan is a contributing analyst at Geopolitical Futures. He is a Professor of political science at the American University of Beirut and a respected author and analyst of Middle Eastern affairs. He is the author of six books, including Hizbullah: A Mission to Nowhere. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019.) He is currently writing a book titled Saudi Arabia: The Dilemma of Political Reform and the Illusion of Economic Development. He is also the author of more than 110 articles that appeared in journals such as Orbis, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, Third World Quarterly, Israel Affairs, Journal of Religion and Society, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, and The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.