Episode Transcript
Christian Smith: Welcome to this podcast from Geopolitical Futures. I’m Christian Smith, China’s People’s Liberation Army. The PLA has become almost unrecognizable from a few years ago. Purges conducted by Xi Jinping, combined with a growing emphasis on tech and AI, has left it in a potentially precarious position. Just by way of example of these purges, just two of the seven members of China’s Central Military Command are still in post from when their term began in 2022. So on today’s podcast, we ask what has happened to the PLA, why and what it says about China’s geopolitical position and strategy. I’m in London. I’m joined by Geopolitical Futures chairman and founder George Friedman from Austin, Texas, and also Geopolitical Futures analyst and China expert Victoria Herczegh from Budapest in Hungary. Welcome to you both. Good to have you both on. George, starting with you, before I suppose we get to the PLA, we wanted to just do a, a little bit of a stock take on China’s, the state of China’s geopolitics, in particular its relationship with the U.S. we, of course, had Trump’s visit to Beijing in May. Xi, just this week, has confirmed that he will visit Washington in about a month’s time for a meeting at the White House. What do you expect out of that?
George Friedman: Well, both nations need a combination with each other. The United States does not want to have hostile military relationship with China. It doesn’t want to be drawn into war. Neither do Chinese. The Chinese problem is, as we’ve talked about, they produce more than they can consume. They have to export, or else their economy stops growing. Economy is growing at little over 4% now. That’s very much different than it used to be. So it needs the United States because that’s his biggest importer. It’s his best customer. And the tariffs and all these things showed them that the United States can go on without those things. So we’re reaching a point where one, Trump is facing many problems. Iran badly needs to have some successes, but even more important, he needs the Chinese to have a very different view of the military and the relationship with the United States. We cannot be dependent on exports from a country that we might go to war with. So these summit talks are essential. That this is the second talk, this time in Washington that the two have had in recent months is a very significant sign. This does not mean for certain that they can reach an accommodation. Remember that in every negotiation at some point, one side or the other stands up and says, well, we’re not going to be able to make a deal. I’m leaving the room. And that’s part of the whole negotiation process. People tend to think of negotiations, except when they’re buying a house or a car, as something that has to go smoothly. No serious negotiation does. And we’re in the middle of that. And this is a pivotal point in history because if the United States and China can reach an accommodation, a new model of geopolitics emerges where the two countries are not lovers, but they’re not hostile to each other. And during the Cold War, this was not the case with the United States and Russia. So we are at a critical moment in history where if the Chinese and the Americans can reach an accommodation, be not hostile to each other militarily, simultaneously not to be tied down economically in various ways, well, that makes it possible for the two to accommodate each other. And given that neither side wants a war with the other or can actually fight a war with each other and both sides have an economic relationship, this summit that’s coming up is going to be a pivotal event. It may not reach a conclusion, but if it fails, a very different reality comes out. So we’re at a critical moment, and
Christian Smith: it was a critical moment. And that adds a really interesting flavor to and for the PLA as well, of course. And that’s what kind of really, really gives a bit of shape to what we’re going to talk about today. Vicky, coming to you, you recently wrote a piece called the Contradiction at the Heart of China’s Military Reforms for Geopolitical Futures. You can find it at geopoliticalfutures.com walk us through some of the changes that China’s military has made or perhaps has been made to the Chinese military over the past couple of years.
Victoria Herczegh: So what has been going on in the PLA is basically an anti corruption campaign, which is not new, a very ordinary belt for China. Ordinary anti corruption campaign has been going on for years now, but in the past year or so, this has become something unprecedented. So there has been an extraordinary purge of the senior leadership since 2022. More than 100 senior officers have reportedly been either removed or investigated. And this has included members of the Central Military Commission, notably, which is the most important body of the PLA rocket force commanders, and two former defense ministers right after each other, Wei Fangheng, Li Xianfu, and very important senior figures, as you mentioned, Christian. One was Zheng Yuxia, who is the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. And also Liu Zhengli, he’s a former PLA general and a senior commander, a very important figure as well. So the result of these purchases is quite remarkable, I would say the Central Military Commission has been reduced to just Xi, who is the chairman of this body, and another person, another official, Discipline Chief, Chang Sheng Min. So those are the two people currently sitting in the Central Military Commission. And this body began in its, its latest term in 2022 with seven members. So it started with seven members and now just to remain. Another thing that is remarkable, I would say, is that Xi has changed the criteria for military promotion. Political reliability is increasingly becoming the main criterion for choosing members of the Central Military Commission. And leaders of the PLA. And also political and disciplinary officials have been elevated into positions that used to be associated with operational leadership. So now discipline, inspection and political supervision are becoming crucial elements of Xi choosing who, who becomes a member of the PLA and the Central Military Commission. Another thing I need to mention here is that Xi is restructuring the PLA’s relationship with technology, basically. So the goal is an increasingly intelligentized military, which would mean integrating AI into, into, into the daily operations of the PLA. And all this is. Well, the purges themselves are not unprecedented, but all this is almost unprecedented. We haven’t seen anything like this in the post Mao era PLA. So there was a similar period during the Cultural Revolution, but since then there hasn’t been anything similar to this. So we have seen purges before, as I’ve said, but not in combination with decapitating the entire leadership almost and an institutional restructuring and the emphasis, the extreme emphasis on political supervision and technological transformation. So at this scale, this is the first time such a thing is happening since the Mao era PLA.
Christian Smith: And Vicky, why is Xi doing this? It is quite the extraordinary move, as you say, and it seems to, we might come on to in a minute what the effect of this is and what it means for, for the PLA as a fighting force. But. But what is driving him to do this?
Victoria Herczegh: So the simplest answer to this would be that Xi appears to not fully trust parts of the Chinese military establishment. So the reason that is given for these purges and investigations is usually corruption, just that word. And that is clearly part of the problem in China. The PLA has struggled with corruption for a long time, particularly around procurement or military contracts, equipment spending, things like that. But corruption alone doesn’t explain the purge, the current scale of purges that is happening. So senior, some of the senior officers I mentioned, they weren’t simply accused of taking bribes, but also of weakening party control and demonstrating Insufficient loyalty and damaging the PLA’s political ecology, which is not being loyal to the leader, basically. So all those things mean just that, not being loyal to Xi or contradicting Xi. So Xi’s doing this because he wants to make absolutely certain that the PLA cannot become an independent political center that would operate separately from the Chinese Communist Party and separately from his person. So this is his deepest logic behind this restructuring. He wants to strengthen the Communist Party and wants to make sure that the Communist Party is always above the PLA and him as a leader is always above.
George Friedman: And the PLA, the Chinese Army Navy have always been focused on the possibility of war with the United States. Ideologically, operationally, this was the center of gravity. Yes, they would have skirmishes with India, sometimes not happy relation with South Korea, but their fundamental fear was the United States. And they built the PLA around that fear. They built the Navy around that fear. They built the army in a way around that fear. And many older ones in the army remember being involved in Vietnam War certain ways. So this military has a culture that is built just as the American culture during the Cold War was built around the Russians, their culture was built around the Americans. This has been going on for a while, these purges. Okay. And the triggers seem to me to be that there seemed to have been an attempted coup by the military. I can’t guarantee this, but at some point, rumors started circulating on social media that Xi was either dead or dying, which was a very strange thing to be done. And shortly after that, he fired all the senior commanders of the Army. So if you take that coming around and the fact that nobody cleared the social media of all these statements, you can kind of imagine, if not be certain, that there was a tension. And I think that tension was built around the fact that I think Xi was realizing the Chinese economy was slowing down, was not growing any longer as magnificently as it had before. It went through that period, as other nations do, and that he needed an accommodation with the Americans. So one of the things that has been going on for the past couple of years is Xi trying to find some sort of way to make an understanding with the United States without capitulating, without being seen to be that way. And the military, which was ideologically conditioned from the time they entered as privates or seamen to be ready to fight the American imperialists, there was a tension that built up. So we saw that when the purges began and they’ve continued. There are two other. There’s one other dimension of this, is that this army being trained for that may not be trained to carry out the functions not facing the United States, but dealing with other issues of other regions. For example, the Chinese claim formally that eastern part of Russia belongs to China because in 19th century, the Russians, shall we say, stole that region from them. And they publish maps showing that that’s the case, that that’s part of China Also, even under the Communists, the Russians and the Chinese were fighting battles along the rivers, the Usuri river, between them at their border. So they did not have good relationships under Mao and Khrushchev at all. Okay. And those relationships have never been as warm. Remember, China did not vote in favor of Russia at the beginning of the Ukraine war. It simply abstained. Its abstention was noted by everyone. So when you take a look at China, it’s had historic, even under communism, tensions with Russia in its history. Russia was hostile to part of its territory. Now they’ve emerged as the second major economy in the world, a massive military force in the region. They are not necessarily friendly with the Russians. They’re not hostile. They’re not intending a war or anything like that. But when you take a look at the Chinese position, it’s a very different thing. Where the fear of the United States was airstrikes and naval power, fear of Russia is in the army. Everybody has to kind of reorganize their thinking, not because they’re expecting war or wanting war, but simply evolving. China’s focus had been on the seas and the airs between the United States and China. It also had a historical animosity toward Russia. Now, if it reaches an understanding of the United States, I think it’s quite likely, if not at this meeting, then the next one. It will happen. Under those circumstances, it has to change its military and its culture. So I think what is happening here is kind of making sure the military doesn’t revolt, making sure that the military is prepared to change its standing. So I think this is part of a broader issue. Not corruption necessarily, although corruption is possibly there. But more importantly, the change in the geopolitical relationship China has with the world, particularly the United States.
Christian Smith: Take a moment to follow and rate us on your preferred podcast platform. If you’re already watching on YouTube, don’t forget to like and subscribe. One of the striking things about these purges really is just not just the seniority of some of them, but how many military leaders have been dismissed, or to varying degrees dismissed. In the hundreds, I believe. And look, I am reminded, as I’m sure many listeners might be as well, purges happen in autocratic regimes, in particular, quite a lot. But I’m reminded of Stalin’s purges in the 30s and how poor of a fighting force that made the Red Army. Surely Xi and others in China will know that they are currently creating a PLA that is not fit for purpose and at least won’t be for a while.
George Friedman: I see it as them not expecting a war. They do not expect a war with the United States. They do not expect a war with Russia. It’s a perfect time for a transition. Because of that, it’s going to take a long time to recover fully, because when the senior commanders are taken out, you have to find new senior commanders, and it takes a while to become an effective senior commander. So this is one of the indications, assuming there was an unintended coup, and that was the whole reason about it, this is about as best time to change the military as there is. Also, you have to remember that the military in all countries is very suspicious of technology. There are ways they do things the way they fight, and they like doing it that way. And all these nifty new objects doesn’t change the way we did it. And so in all armies all over the world, after you’ve served for 20 or 30 years, you think you know it all and there’s no change possible. And stop with these silly ideas that could also be a factor in this, that the Army, Air Force, all these people have to evolve into some new technologies. So there is the geopolitical. There’s also the technological dimension.
Christian Smith: Well, on that technological dimension, Vicky, you also have been writing about sort of the downsides for this Fiji as well.
Victoria Herczegh: Yes, this technological modernization definitely has its downsides, and it has some risks to the Chinese leadership. So as I’ve said, Xi wants to intelligentize the military. That’s the expression that is translated from Chinese. In Chinese, it sounds more natural. Yeah, but intelligent warfare requires humans. It requires human initiative. It requires people who can. Who can question AI systems and prove them wrong if needed. But Xi’s current political system, which is based very much on loyalty, unquestioned loyalty, it discourages that behavior. Like people, officers criticizing technology and this intelligent military that Xi wants to build. So Xi wants to integrate AI into all areas of the military, of the PLA. And. But his political system rewards commanders and officials who demonstrate conformity above all. So this would make people, for example, Central Military Commission members, new Central Military Commission members, not to criticize these, these rules of AI modernization and the integration of AI into the PLA. So Xi’s making the PLA more Controllable, he wants to do that. But at the same time this could have a negative effect on the PLA. It would make it less competent independently, so the purges. So this whole thing makes sense in one sense, because it would reinforce Xi’s authority and reduce corruption, which has been a deeply embedded problem. But it has the potential to make experienced officers and officers willing to criticize the leaders decisions disappear. They would be purged or they wouldn’t be put into leading positions of the Central Military Commission. So currently there are temporary members being tried out basically by Xi in the Central Military Commission. So there are people temporarily taking the roles of the members that have been purged and Xi’s monitoring them, seeing if they are willing to comply with what he wants to modernize in the military. And this AI thing is one of the key elements of that. And there is a danger that these new members would overcompensate and over comply. They would accept anything that Xi says or he orders and they would become basically too aggressive in demonstrating loyalty and base their decisions not on what they find logical or beneficial to the military, but what would keep them in their positions. Because people in such high positions have to fear not for their lives necessarily every day, but being purged definitely. So there is that risk. And because of that, strategic caution can decrease and tactical risk taking can increase. And that could lead to miscalculation, which in a military operation, just imagining that could be catastrophic. But exactly because of this, I don’t think China is prepared for a real military operation in any way. And this would not be a good timing for Xi to consider any such thing
Christian Smith: again. I mean, you see this a lot in autocratic regimes. It reminds me a lot of the stories from the Second World War with Hitler’s generals and some of their inability to, to act without his own direct orders. Vicky Vicki Sticking with that then. I mean, flipping on its head and you touched on it before, how much of this has also got to do with just G? Is is someone who’s been particularly interested in the reasons behind the Soviet Union’s fall. How much of this is him trying to avoid that, trying to ensure that the Communist Party stays strong, stays on top.
Victoria Herczegh: He definitely wants to ensure that the parties is above everything and definitely above the PLA and he wants to make sure that he stays in power. So at this point we are talking about not just the Chinese Communist Party stabilizing its rule and, and avoiding any weakening, but Xi himself being able to avoid anything similar to a coup or anything planned against his person because What George mentioned about, I think it was last June to July, those few weeks, there was definitely something happening there, not necessarily a coup attempt, but I also cannot deny that, because we don’t know, and not much information gets out of China. But the rumors were there. And Ng fears for his own rule. At least he wants to stay in power for this current term, and he’s willing to do. Do anything. And he’s willing to get inspired from the Soviet times and from the histories of other Communist parties. But at the same time, what he does is very Chinese, and he’s also willing to criticize past regimes that failed to stay stable. So he also does that.
Christian Smith: George, let me ask you this. What do we actually know about the capabilities of the PLA? Obviously, it’s an enormous armed force or armed forces, but they haven’t really been involved in many wars over the years. Perhaps different, particularly now to Russia, different to the US Even before these purges, and of course, now after them as well. What do we make of. What do this, the US and others make of them as a form of force?
George Friedman: Well, on paper, they’re a very significant force given the technologies they have, the vessels they have, the aircraft and everything else, and missiles and nuclear power. But until you go to war, either as a private or as a general, it’s not known what you’re going to do and how well you’re going to do it. The peacetime army is fundamentally different from wartime army. Unfortunately, in the United States, we’ve had sufficient wars that the senior officers be vetted in certain ways that they would have experienced it, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, some going back to Vietnam. That’s gone yet. But given the fact that we had conflicts of those sorts that lasted a period of significant period of time and had an enemy that was quite capable of holding us. We haven’t seen the Air Force, the Navy, or really the army in operations for a while. Many of these generals have not been under fire. Many of the soldiers, they have not been under fire. So you can’t really evaluate an army or its command structure simply by exercises. They’ve done very complex exercises and carried out well. But when the bullets start to fly and the bodies start to fall, things change. So what we have here is an army that is to a great extent untried, which is the case with many armies. Okay. And you find out afterwards, after the bullets start to fly, how good they are. But I would think that the Chinese army is sufficiently disciplined to be able to survive the first shock of war and carry it out I assume the officers of that army are capable of training them. And I assume that given all their weaponry, their capabilities of sophistication, they’re able to fight. But I’ve not seen them do that against a real enemy. And this may have been one of the reasons why we saw Xi both urging the army and opening to the United States to reduce the possibility of war, which he’s not sure how it would end, nor is the United States sure how it would end. So that’s the other side.
Victoria Herczegh: I’d like to mention here that it’s interesting that the PLA leaders are well aware of some of these shortcomings that the Chinese army has. It’s unusual for China that in the PLA Daily, for example, which is the main mouthpiece of the PLA, there are articles written by central Military Commission members and well known PLA members detailing, well, not always focusing on, but detailing some of the shortcomings that the military has. For example, the corruption issue is often mentioned. Procurement problems or training issues, these are not mentioned as catastrophic or anything that cannot be resolved. But I think it’s significant that in China, in Chinese state media, these things are mentioned. So along with the rapid and remarkable modernization, these shortcomings are there. And these things are not coming from Western media mainly, but from Chinese state media.
Christian Smith: Want actionable insight from geopolitical futures? Introducing geoeconomic lens helping you understand not just what is happening but but how global power dynamics shape economic stability, dependency and opportunity. Explore the first issue for free at geopoliticalfutures.com Lens the question that always needs to be asked really is the question of Taiwan. Then you both sort of said that it looks like through this restructuring or the purges or however you want to describe it, China’s not looking for war anytime soon. But that might perhaps, as you say, be towards the US or a bigger enemy. What about Taiwan? Or does the same logic apply? George, let me ask you that.
George Friedman: Well, Taiwan is important for the Chinese because it blocks the passage between Japan and the Philippines. So there are narrow pathways into the Pacific that can be readily blocked by missiles from Guam if they went to war with the United States. So Taiwan matters. Now there’s an evolution going on in Taiwan itself where one of the parties, the Kuominthung, the KMT party, is desiring a new relationship with China. Not one in which Taiwan doesn’t have a degree of independence, but one in which it had recognized that it is part of China with a great deal of autonomy. So the country split down the middle on this. There’s about half of the country which is utterly hostile to this idea. Part of the country, the younger people particularly, that are very open to this idea. So things are evolving inside of Taiwan. At the same time, the issue is not that important to the United States. If the Chinese enter a new period in which they are not hostile to the United States, in which their exercises are not directed against the enemy of the United States, and so on and so forth. Okay, so this is where it comes in. Can there be an understanding between the United States and China that they are economically intertwined, needing each other to reduce prices in the United States, to consume products from China, and that this is not compatible with war? One of the reasons, I think that one of the things that Xi first said when Trump went, he talked about Taiwan as the critical issue. There’s something symbolic on it. If he changes the attitude to the United States and doesn’t have Taiwan, he’s in a much weaker position. He looks like he’s capitulated to the United States. If, on the other hand, the United States doesn’t abandon, but shifts the relationship it has with Taiwan and Taiwan shifts the age of China, he’s safe on that point. He has a victory. When the President went to China, to Beijing, the first thing that Xi said publicly was about Taiwan. It is not that it’s so critical at this point, certainly not if there’s not hostility between the United States and China. But it’s symbolic because the country and the army too, potentially the military will see this as a capitulation if it’s not carried out very carefully. Since I think that Trump and the United States does need an understanding with China on all these matters, there’s going to have to be a symbolic symbol, shall we say, of an American giving some things that they don’t want to give. And Taiwan is the one. Now, remember that China’s always feared Taiwan, but never attacked it, never invaded, carried out exercises around it, never did anything militarily effective in any way. Okay. When you bear that in mind, it was frightening to the Taiwanese, likely to the Americans, but the Chinese never tried that. So when they focus on Taiwan, it’s something they didn’t need so badly as to act, but need badly in terms of principle. So I think this is going to be the fundamental issue. The Taiwan can. The United States cannot be seen as abandoning another ally, you know, just shoving them into Chinese hands. The Chinese have to have some concessions on Taiwan. So this is one of the things that is clear that Xi wants, needs. This is one of the things that Trump obviously doesn’t want to do. But it’s the one thing that has to be done. And I think what will happen is an agreement in which China is officially recognized as part of China, but as a fundamentally autonomous part, like Hong Kong, but even more so. Okay. And so they go on their own way. The Chinese do not act hostilely to part of China, and the Taiwanese do not, let’s say, Americans, to unload there. So there is an agreement possible if there’s a genuine understanding between the two sides. Again, going back to the purges of the military, the generals that were purged grew up from childhood into generalship, constantly focused on the United States and worried about it and looking at it, their ability to shift as generals have. The difficulty of shifting mindsets on geopolitics may have been one of the reasons for these purges. Not necessarily because they were corrupt. They may have been. Not necessarily because they would not evolve. It could have been that. But that they were so focused on the United States as an enemy that no accommodation could be made and therefore the economic problems of China not reduced.
Christian Smith: Well, look, we started the podcast talking about US China relations. Let’s finish with that as well. And, George, so one question to you. In the last few days, we had Donald Trump coming out, and in a particularly Donald Trump way, I think you might say, and doing a post about Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, canceling or scaling back exercises with the South Korean military, annual exercises, which, according to some reports, upset the South Koreans. George, do you think this had much to do with North Korea at all, or do you think this was more about sending a message to the Chinese in some ways, too?
George Friedman: Well, you have to remember the Chinese are not friends with North Korea. Until a few months ago, you couldn’t even travel between them on trains. Trains were ingoing. They were not happy seeing the North Koreans having a nuclear weapon because they didn’t trust them. On the other hand, they didn’t want to see the United States take them out. So on the question of North Korea, I think China and the United States are somewhat aligned. We got to do something about them, and each one wants the other one to do something. But more importantly, the forces in South Korea were there ever since the Korean War. The Chinese were involved in the hostilities deeply in the Korean War. For the Chinese, this is a symbol of that war continuing. Secondly, remember, South Korea is very friendly to China. It is not hostile in any way. Okay? It does have no fear of their invading, and its economy is really enmeshed with the Chinese and South Korea has evolved dramatically economically. Okay, I was recently there. It’s extraordinary what’s become so under these circumstances. Pulling troops out of South Korea doesn’t worry the South Koreans very much, is a symbol that Xi can show to others the United States is serious about this. And I’m not just folding my cards. That I’m doing something and that the United States would say something nice about North Korea indicates that possibly he could actually think nice thoughts about China as well or try to outflank them to make North Korea and American a lie. But remember, North Korea is not a Chinese ally just because they’re communists, they’re not friendly and they nobody in the region wants them to have nuclear weapons and they don’t want to give it away because nobody in the region likes it. So this is not something that puts a block on this relationship with the United States and China. In a way, it’s parallel play.
Christian Smith: Well, look on that. Let’s leave it there. George, as always, thank you very much. Vicky, thank you very much for joining us. Thank you out there for listening. You can go to geopoliticalfutures.com of course, to find out about everything we’ve been talking about. There’s lots of articles, including on this and many other things in the world of geopolitics. We’ll be back again soon with another podcast, but until then, you take care and goodbye. You can find all of our expert geopolitical analysis@geopoliticalfutures.com.
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