Last week, my colleague Kamran Bokhari predicted the emergence of a new Middle Eastern geopolitical order. He noted that that order would be built around an alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Later in the week, that theory became a reality as the three countries announced an alliance based on the principle of collective security. I predicted some time ago that there would be an alliance between Turkey and Saudi Arabia; I had not imagined Pakistan would be involved.
Crucially, the alliance members are in close proximity to Iran. (Pakistan and Turkey share a border with Iran, while Saudi Arabia is separated only by a relatively narrow gulf.) Iran has already attacked Saudi Arabia. Ankara has largely kept out of the conflict – despite having been targeted by Iranian missiles, despite being generally hostile toward Iran and despite its NATO membership. Pakistan mediated the negotiations between the United States and Iran, and for that reason seemed to me to be neutral. (Iran also fired missiles at Pakistan in early 2024.) That it has joined the alliance indicates that if there was any neutrality, it is now gone.
Kamran detailed all of this expertly. But I would now like to consider the broader impact of this new order beyond the region. First, consider that Pakistan has a highly capable military and is a nuclear power besides. Consider next that Turkey is NATO’s second-largest military. Finally, consider that Saudi Arabia is very close with the United States. None of them desire combat with Iran, but Iran cannot be certain of their course of action. The existence of the alliance, and the added hostility from the U.S., increases the likelihood that Iran will want to find an offramp, which could open up the Strait of Hormuz and ease, if not end, the global energy crisis.
It seems clear that the United States was aware that this alliance was forming and hoped that it would allow it to end its role in the conflict. It is certainly in Washington’s interest to do so. But the consequences extend well beyond the United States. Pakistan has long had hostile relations with India, and India has had hostilities with China. India has been working to create an alliance with China’s neighbors, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The fact that the U.S. is also advancing toward some kind of accommodation with China has expedited the process. Given that Pakistan has excellent relations with China, and that Saudi Arabia and Turkey have no major issues with China, the new alliance will clearly not be hostile to China. All of this potentially places more pressure on India and will potentially make its own search for an Indo-Pacific alliance even more urgent unless Pakistan and India can reach a settlement on their own. Trust between them is difficult to foresee.
Turkey’s NATO membership complicates things too. Ankara has the same obligation to fellow NATO members as it does to this new alliance: An attack on one is an attack on all. This raises important questions regarding Russia. Turkey has a long and complex relationship with Russia, but their current tensions boil down to the Black Sea, which is essential to Turkish trade with Europe and which is essentially a battleground in the Ukraine war. Over the past six years, Turkey has also emerged as a major player in the South Caucasus, which until 2020 was in Russia’s sphere of influence. Relations between the Kremlin and Armenia and Azerbaijan have declined ever since. Russian military operations in the Black Sea are designed to block Ukraine’s access, and at this point, those operations are threatening shipping for any vessels sailing those waters.
It is not possible to create a fully coherent model of what the three-power alliance in the Middle East means for everyone, but it is clear that the alliance has a major impact on many other geopolitical relationships. Also clear is that the alliance appears to benefit the U.S. significantly, particularly as it puts pressure on Iran. It is likely a net benefit to China too, given Pakistan’s membership in the alliance and close relationship with China.
The most interesting effect may be on U.S.-China relations. The oil shortage caused by the U.S.-Iran war hurt China badly. Washington clearly wants to end the war for its own reasons, and this increases the likelihood of Iran being forced to reach some accommodation with the U.S., therefore relieving China’s oil problems along with the rest of the world’s. Of course, the U.S. was aware of the new alliance in the Middle East and thus welcomed it. This makes Turkey a pivotal nation, part of the European system and now likely in the long run the center of the Middle Eastern system.
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