

Special Series on Warfare: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
Webinar transcription

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George Friedman:

So let's let it begin by talking about the origin of this, because this is pretty close to my heart. One of our members came to me. Okay. The narrative after one of the lecturers said, you know, we really ought to do something on power projection.

And I love the idea of doing something, a power projection, because it's something I've participated in written and so on. But power rejection by itself is not enough. Uh, what I really need to do is stay about war there's. A whole, Chris para rejection is an isolated dimension of war. And very frequently people talk about war as if the most important thing is the weapon or the aircraft or something like that. In point of fact, it's very important, but a war is an enormously more complex thing. So I thought what we do is really have a seminar that goes into the nature of war, not from a philosophical point of view, but from an operational point of view, uh, not simply in terms of armored combat, but in terms of the entire process that leads you into a war, makes you fight a war and so on and so forth.

So what we're doing is beginning with an analysis of the 1973 Arab Israeli war. The reason for that is after the fact, it's three days to Yom Kippur and the 47th anniversary of the war. Uh, the reason we do that, however, is I need a war to hang my discussion on. War that is the least abstract thing in a world. It is the most concrete thing. It is the most important thing, perhaps that anyone participates in our countries participated. And to understand a war, you have to understand it is whole. I chose 1973 because it was the most critical transitional war we've had. World war two was a war primarily of armor of man bombers, the fighter planes and aircraft carriers. It primarily was a war of ballistic projectiles. By that I mean, once you fire, it goes where you aimed. And that means a great deal. It means that, uh, the number of bullets that have to be fired are far greater than if you had a single shot. 1973 still used armor, still used aircraft, still used what you use the aircraft character, but didn't have much of a Naval capacity. But 1973 was the introduction into warfare of a set of new weapons, of new style weapons, which we call PGM work, precision guided munitions. Some of them had already been present, particularly on the Soviet side in Vietnam. They'd provided them to the Vietnamese and frequently Mandan themselves, but they'd been provided to the Egyptians and the Syrians. The two most important ones were the Sam six, a surface to air missile that was fired manually, but guided itself to the target, uh, electronically basically through a radar and the 83 Sagor and its NATO terminology, which was a wire guided anti-tank missile.

Now what these two did was change the dynamic of war. The command of the air was no longer a matter of fighters, fighting fighters, biters shooting down bombers, what have you. It became a contest between attack aircraft and surface air missiles, uh, combat that frequently the surface air missile one, which meant that command of the air was now completely different than before. The 83 Sagir was a wire guided optically managed anti-tank missile that had an incredibly high hit rate because it was guided to the target by, uh, the person managing it. And being targeted in this way, it had a hit-kill ratio that was staggering. The entire brigade of Israeli tanks were savaged by these. Now this changed the nature of our major armored warfare. This change nation of air warfare and old happened in the 73 war.

And oddly enough, most of the innovations were Soviet, not American. That's interesting to think about as we go down the line now. Today, the great grandchildren of those weapons dominate the skies. Today, the precision guided munition is present everywhere and everything. Okay. And precision is the essence of what war is about. The reason I picked this war is it still had the basic characteristics of world war II. Okay. But at the same time, and this is very important, it gave birth to the future. Now, when we finish this program, we're going to go to China. We're going to model a US-Chinese war, whether it's going to happen, not as not important, but we'll have the tools to moderate and to some extent even game it out together. Okay. But before we do, we really have to begin by having a war to the hanger hats on. So it tells us how to think about war. And it has to be a war that already incorporates all of the new weapons systems that are there today. In 1973 was really the moment of change. It was a war in which the Israelis thought they had overwhelming superiority in which they thought they were going to handle the first strike with fighter aircraft fandom aircraft, in fact, F4 Phantoms, and sweep enemy armor off the, off the, off the road, off the roof, if you will. And they were certain that their armor was going to be able to mass and attack the enemy effectively. Well, what happened was that they suffered terrible losses in their aircraft, never quite clear to the Egyptians out or the Syrians. And it happened that their armor didn't work. In fact, something very interesting happened. The arm, the anti-tank missiles were being managed by Egypt action and Syrian special forces troops. This is really stunning because the Israelis didn't realized they developed special forces troops, but the special forces manned them, and for the first time infantry was blunting armor attacks. And so in order to clear the way for the tanks, infantry had to go in and nearly in handbell pretty much in hand-to-hand combat to clear the way clearing out the Egyptian, uh, anti-tank missiles, then letting the tanks go forward. The tanks were introduced in first world war to substitute and spearhead infantry attacks. And now the reverse had taken place. So in this war, as we'll see, we will have seen certain, absolutely remarkable changes that had not yet taken place because after that war, all of, every bit of Israel's operations were reviewed by the Americans who went tank to tank, weapon to weapon, battleground to battleground. And also the Soviets learned a million things. This was the war that modern combat of this century was really forged.

So we have to start somewhere. I thought we'd start in that one, because that was that important. Now my plan here is to talk for about 20 minutes, then flip it open to questions and discussions. And when that's done, go back. I've allocated two hours for this, because this is my love. And also, because this is something that you have to really get into. One of the biggest problems in a study of warfare is, there were two really. One, the quick read about what happened in the war. And second, Jane's defense weekly. I want, I love Jane's. I love Jane's information, but it turns war into something about technology. Technology is certainly present in everything I said, but the key was that there were now Egyptian special forces troops, standing toe to toe with Israeli tanks and winning. That was a huge difference. All the technology they had didn't matter until the Sam operator was willing to stand his ground, while two Phantoms came down at him managing missiles, going at them. This, this was the critical thing. Okay. Um, I believe very deeply in technology. I also believe very deeply in the Sergeant. My view of warfare is that I got to have a great general and a great master Sergeant, senior Sergeant will do as well. You can leave the kernels, the majors and the rest home. Well, that's my daughter and son in law and everything else, but what the hell? You know what I'm saying? They can leave them home. And it's really going to be the Sergeant that holds the unit together and is going to be the general. Who's going to conceive of how the battle is going on unfold.

And they will use the various tools of the, of the game. They will order the new tools as a team and the Sergeant will fight and win in spite of the tools of the game. And one of the things I want you to

remember is that in this war, the Egyptian sergeants were every bit as good as the Israeli. Uh, and that's something that really stunned Israelis and something we're going to talk about. So my intention here is to take us from the 73 war through X, some times periods who are really going to dig into a weaponry and how they're evolving, and then bring all that together in thinking about what a us Chinese war would look like. Not that I think they would be one, but what the hell? It's the only one we got. So we'll do the best we can.

When you think about war, you tend to think about the battlefield, but more is a much more complex thing is plows of it said a war is the continuation of politics. By other means, I put it differently. There are five dimensions of war sequential and overlapping. Did you have to know first the imperative? Why are they going to war? Why are they going to go to this? So for example, in world war two, did Japanese have to go to war because the U S cut off the flow of raw materials from Southeast Asia, they had to go to war or accept domination by the United States. That was their imperative. Why the United States have to go to war because they were attacked. So sometimes the imperative is on multiple sides. Sometimes the imperative is on one side, but if you don't understand the imperative, you won't understand the strategy.

If you don't understand the strategy, you won't understand the tactics. The Japanese had to go to war. The United States, the United States had a war plan, world pan orange, or that said they would concede the Philippines to the Japanese and then come and sail and meet the Japanese at the high seas and feed them the Japanese intelligence. You have this plan. It, wasn't hard to find it out, to bid all the Naval war college. And so they decided that instead of going after the Philippines first, they had to go against a fleet that was going to sail against them. And that gave them Pearl Harbor. The imperative that caused him to do this, gave them Pearl Harbor that gave them the tactics of carrier warfare and so on and so forth through the war. If you don't understand the why of warfare, you don't understand the war. And one of my criticism are of the technologists is they assume there was a reason for war. And therefore are surprised that the weapons either don't get used the way they were intended to be, or they don't work for the circumstance they're to be founded. You have to know the reason for the war. The second thing you have to have is intelligence before the war starts during the war, after the war intelligence permeates everything. The Japanese knew that the American fleet was in Harbor at Pearl. The Americans at that point did not know that the Japanese were coming. They had known that the Japanese sleet had put the sea, but they had no intelligence about where the target was and were stunned intelligence later when the Americans were able to decode Japanese messages. I mean, that was critical. That was overwhelming. The third thing you have to have the capability, you have to have a clear understanding of the capability of the enemy. And that is not simply a question of catalog of weapons that they have. It is a question of training of command structure, of appropriateness to, to train, to flexibility, to all these things. You have to understand the capability enemy, because as we'll see the United States vastly under estimated the capability of the Japanese, the Japanese understood in the way what they were getting into. It was a three year hard war because of that. Then you have to understand combat. You've got to really get combat at this point, because this is where they all meet and we can spend, and we will spend over half the time that we're doing it, talking about combat, but only after we've integrated everything else into it. And then finally, there's war termination. How the war ends will we allow the Japanese to have an armistice and keep their holdings and try, what did Japanese allow us to hold on to Pearl Harbor?

What our perception of our own war, terminal termination strategies and their war termination strategy determines what we'll have to do, what is going to be get done. So these are the five things I want to be able to talk to you about and give you a sense of my sense of what it's about the war's imperative. We'll talk about narrative. Is it really war the intelligence capabilities, the capability of the enemy, and you hear your own and very important. Do you really know what the case, your own capability is? Uh, the combat, the way this all plays out and finally, and particularly interesting in the Arab Israeli already war the war termination. Because when we talk about that, we'll see the war did not terminate the way the Victor expected it to. Okay. So now my clock, which is infallible, it's telling me, I've talked to for 20 minutes, let me throw it open for discussion or questions.

Meredith Friedman:

So let's first go to the people in our panel here and ask if any of them have a comment, Rob, I see your hand up, go ahead.

Speaker:

Uh, George, as a retired Lieutenant Colonel life. You just insulted me earlier.

George Friedman:

I insulted half my family. And I'm going to make sure they see this.

Speaker:

Yeah. The, uh, one of the things from reading the books and the after action reports and everything is I hit, I think you hit it on the head. I think it certainly needs to be talked about is really the rebuild of both the Syria and then particularly the Egyptian army and the incorporation of college educated, uh, people that were actually forced into the Egyptian army by the government. And so you had soldiers, some noncommissioned officers, all having college educations. Uh, and I think that was, you know, what you're talking about with, you know, the people aspect of things was huge in this, I think particularly with the complexity of, you know, breaching the bar lab line, I mean that couldn't have been done it with the troops they had in the 67 war. And then I'd say also, it's just, you know, the complete rebuild of the equipment, you know, and the Soviet advisors and all the things that went into, you know, the training and equipping and the amount of material that was given to both armies, uh, that made kind of this difference. And I think, you know, after that, you know, you gotta just question, you know, what the hell happened with the Israeli intelligence on, you know, on this, because it was just horrible. I mean, you know, the run up to this thing, how come they couldn't see all this happening? So, I mean, that's just my initial comment on this.

George Friedman:

Well, if you've ever seen a conversation with TSA guy and da guy, that's what happened. The Israelis knew it was coming. When you say Israelis, Maasai knew I'm on military intelligence denied it. So if you've ever seen, had the opportunity to see a conversation between the two fellows, the military intelligence guys and the political intelligence guys, what happened was it got tangled. The reality got tangled up in the fact that each side wanted to win the arguments, not win the war. That war was abstract from them. They were gunning for each other. And that's one of the problem. When you start dividing military intelligence from political intelligence, you get in trouble. Stalin saw this problem by regularly shooting everybody and starting over again, before they could get into it. That's not a joke by the way, that's what he did. But, but we'll go into that very soon. I really want to go into that. Um, which

is that it was an amazing situation. Plus Israeli self-confidence killed him for a military force. You want to have confidence. If you don't have a confident force, you can't fight, but there's this line between confidence and overconfidence go into war afraid of your enemies. Capabilities always imagined they have far more than your intelligence. People tell you, they have think of them as brighter than you are. Okay. Don't let it paralyze you. I mean, combat is that kind of experience where on the one hand you want to do the only same thing there is, which is bury yourself in a hole hide. Now you've got to get yourself out of that hole and engage the enemy. But if you do this in a cocky way, you will get killed very fast. How do you balance fear? And you, you know that line, and this is what we will talk about. And that's what I want to do in this, which is, I don't want to start by talking if I have the theme, the capabilities of an essay, six, as opposed to essay two, which frequently is the American approach to war. I want to talk about a Sergeant. I want you who hit the Rhine perfectly. He would instruct you that you are a pile of garbage and having destructed you, his thought what he said. He said something different. You're a pile of it though, but then instructed you inch by inch to build yourself confidence and then told you how great the enemy was. That was a Sergeant who did that. Generals don't do that. God knows Lieutenant colonels, do it all the time. Wait, I've got three colonels in my family. I can't wait until each of them get to see this, but the ones in the air force, he's not reading military.

Meredith Friedman:

Okay. Um, Evan, you have your hand up and, uh, let's, let's get some comments from you on this first part and we'll move along to, uh, Lakey as well. And then we'll probably move on to the next section and then come back to questions.

Speaker:

Sure. Um, thank you. And, um, Robert, I don't discount you as a Lieutenant Colonel. Okay. But, um, but clearly there was a, such an abundance of hubris on the Israelis, um, side of the ledger, uh, coming out of the, um, the 67 war, uh, which was a preemptive strike. And why was it preemptive? Um, obviously the intelligence was good enough where they realized they had to strike because Israel's borders are so compact, there was no possibility, or at least during those, with those borders in 1967, um, for, to have any sort of defense and depth. So their entire, um, their entire policy to engagement policy was predicated upon having 72 hours to mobilize their reserves to reinforce the front locks. So this is what I just completely can't understand. Um, one of the, then current military geniuses in Israel was general Bar-Lev general Bar-Lev solution after the 67 war was to build a sort of magical line on the Eastern side of the Suez. Um, and everybody knows including general, the great, you know, white Saint of Israel's military intellectual establishment. Um, they understood what happened to the, um, I understood what happened to the imaginal line, the Germans, and, uh, when they invaded France in 1940, they just simply went around it. They avoided it. And the Egyptian wasn't that much different either. You know, they didn't go through the seven or eight reinforced positions. They went around it. So therefore denied. So creating the bar Lev line, um, basically denied Israel, its sole advantage with respect to, uh, the Sinai, where there was a possibility to have a defense in depth, to the extent that they could use most of their, um, uh, armored and infantry, should they choose to deploy them this way? They could have used their mobility to counteract the Egyptians, uh, which should have been their first card as opposed to their last card. Um, so I don't understand really how, um, it was even possible for, uh, coming out of the six day war for the, uh, for Israel, for the Israelis to basically adopt this principle defense of strategy in their Southern theater.

George Friedman:

So let me, this is military strategy by committee is what happened. Bar-Lev did not see this as imaginal line, but as a listening time and intelligence gathering, he wanted a tripwire from his point of view, he wants to draw the Egyptians as deep into the Sinai as possible, even into the Midland, the Judy passes two passes that run through there in order to get, engage them and annihilate them there as they built it, the committee, whoever it was decided to, but as well as backward fortification, just tell me where I can put it. They fortified as if it were, uh, a SharePoint Hardpoint, okay. While leaving huge gaps between them. Okay. But the truth there, and this was the point was they didn't believe the Egyptians could organize across the Suez canal. They believe that the Suez canal was the, imagine a line that the Egyptians were not able to carry out the complex mission.

And I'll talk about this now because it was worthwhile. The Israelis completely misunderstood. What happened in the six day war to the Egyptians? Their view was that as soon as these really came into contact with the Egyptians, they panicked, threw away their weapons ran away in the postwar study of the Israeli showed the 20% that came into contact because I was all that was in contact fought well, Israeli suffered enough casualties trying to take these positions. The problem was the generals. The generals position was that an infantry war could not be conducted without air control air superiority. We call that the Israeli attack in the morning that wiped out the Egyptian air force, left them without any chance of air superiority. They ordered a retreat. Now that retreat was mismanaged by the senior commanders. Okay. You know, you're going to retreat an army of several hundred thousand people, uh, across the desert by about 120 miles. You better have this as a contingency to plan, you know what to do they hadn't done.

So my point is having met your consultants soldiers of fine final soldiers, the generals were political generals and incompetent. One of the things that God did, he bade them goodbye and bought a new layer of generals. Sadat understood that his men could carry out that action. He needed commanders who could imagine it. Okay. The Israelis could not grasp that just as they were doing. Lessons learned, Egyptians are doing lessons, learned their vision of the, and I heard this from them. Their vision of the Arab soldier was illiterate, unmotivated fool, whose only interest was escaping with his life, which is not a trivial thing to do, but that that's all he was, it was the sergeants and the corporals and the private state totally misunderstood. They thought that the generals could come up with fancy schemes. They could not imagine that the troops and here who first captains a commander and curls into it too. Okay. Could actually execute this, the complexity and the brilliance of the operation, both of the Egyptians and of the Syrians stunned them. And this is why I say the second phase of this work is intelligence. And that intelligence has got to give you capability. And the capability is not how many, how it serves you have, but will the artillery men continue to fire the howitzers when they're under fire themselves? So that's what I think was the crucial thing. Okay.

Speaker:

I know that Fred has his hand up. So I'll be brief with, uh, my response with respect to the why, which I think is integrated in to your second level of, uh, overlapping issues, uh, which is intelligence, the principle failure, the root, the root of the problem was that the Israelis in their intelligence failure didn't accurately perceive the humiliation of the Arabs and how somebody as intelligent as Saddat could basically feed on that in order to remediate the situation, to stack the odds in his favor, which goes to Rob's point by professionalizing the middle core of, um, uh, of soldiers in between generals and, um, enlisted men.

George Friedman:

So what I would argue is the Israelis were aware of the humiliation and they thought they couldn't overcome it. They thought this was the fella hin, the normal Eric accepting his mediocrity is what they didn't understand is they didn't exist. The Egyptian soldiers didn't have to be this way that he could be commanded to be this way, but he was not a bad soldier. They were very tough soldiers, very good soldiers. They had been humiliated, but he has really felt this humiliate issue taught them a lesson of what they really were. In fact, it taught the Israelis lesson, what they were. Anyway.

Meredith Friedman:

Let's move on. Um, I'm able to cover a lot of this in your plays. Electric Lakey had his hand up and then Fred, um, and then we need to go back to your train of thought on imperatives.

Speaker:

Yeah. We keep saying intelligence, intelligence and township, the failure of intelligence, as far as I could tell it means it depends what we mean by intelligence. And that's, I suppose the question in my view would be that the, the fact that data, um, was there, uh, was always there. Well, what, it was not used, the meaning of it was not taken into account, uh, for example, that ...

Meredith Friedman:

You're breaking up a bit, there.

Speaker:

That's an interpretation. Is that any better?

George Friedman:

Let me just answer it, cause I got your point. These Mossad had the information, they had a source, they were source driven. The defense, Amman, it defend establishment operated from a different method of concept. They had a concept of the circumstances under which is Egypt would go to war. Well, I'll talk about that later each of to not reach those. So they assumed they decided war was not possible. They were not ready for the war on the other side of the equation, uh, a source, what is it worth? So the whole problem here is analysis. Yes, they had the information. How did they put it together? And the most important point was they had multiple organizations giving intelligence analysis. The golden, my ear was a really smart woman and everything else like that. And Moshe Diane, who was brilliant as he would tell anybody, um, would give us intelligence. And they had conflicting intelligence as Alto Iris here, who was the head of a man of military intelligence was saying that the possibility of war was near zero. And he'd get a great argument. Why with sourcing and everything, what side? The saying, I'm talking to someone who's utterly connected and he's telling me it's going to start at 6:00 PM today. And so the politician now has to make a decision between competing intelligence services. On the one hand, you want competing intelligent services. You want multiple ways of looking at things you want that. Okay. On the other hand, that leaves you with the question that the crucial moment you're two Intel guys are fighting each other, debating it. So it was not a question of stupidity. It was in my mind, two different methodologies coming up with different questions and a military structure, including, you know, don't do that at a czar who could not make a decision at a certain point. This is a Colin Powell once said, I want to hear everything the intelligence people say, and when they're done, we'll go to say, thank you very much, leave the room. And then the adults will make a decision. And that was, I think the smartest thing, he said many smart things, but that was way up there that in the end you have to have a

command structure that can make a decision based on intelligence even when it's contradictory. Okay. And that's the hardest thing about a general. You got to make the right call from the information. Anyway, I'm done.

Meredith Friedman:

Fred, I know you have a question. I don't know if it can hold till the next break or if you want to get in here and ask it now, go ahead.

Speaker:

Meredith, I do have some comments, major Georges narratives narratives, just to follow up on the point that Josh Harris all give his book, uh, assigns fall to the Israeli intelligence because as George pointed out, they had a certainly ingrained viewpoint toward, uh, as he described and that the intelligence that went into a feedback that Arabs aren't ready they're competent, or that said otherwise. So his claim was that there was a feedback loop and that was one of the major problems with intelligence. If you want me to hold my comments about the imperatives, I will.

Meredith Friedman:

Ok, George, do you have anything to respond to that, then I want to read one question. That'll take us right back to the political goals.

George Friedman:

You're asking me. I have my view is since this is sort of my profession, it was a massive failure of intelligence, but it was also a massive failure of national command authority. Intelligence will always grab the ball, say I got it. Okay. You have two competing intelligence organizations for a reason to give you competing views. The basic problem was that the national command authority, the minister of defense, the chief of staff, the army, others are and Diane, okay. We're paralyzed between the two points of view. They were prepared for it. So there was a, there's an institutional problem, inherit and intelligence that the Americans experienced all the time, virtually every country experiences, but rarely in such a desperate moment where the entire system got paralyzed. Now I will talk about, I think the biggest failure was of military intelligence I'm on. Okay. But there was also a failure, a message. Do I have the right answer, but didn't know how to frame it. So as political masters could understand it, but let's go and move on.

Meredith Friedman:

Um, Paul and Mark, I'm going to come to you in the next break, but I want to read one question, George, and I'd like you to go back to the imperatives. What are the two conflicting political goals that led to this war? I've not heard a succinct answer to these questions elsewhere... But one more. By the way, majors are the busiest people on the battlefield. And this is from James Cox.

George Friedman:

They absolutely are. Somebody's got to take care of the ration book at this, got to be doing a study of the, my God... you know, what is the inventory of ... Hey, I love majors. I love colonels, they're in my family, but in the same way that I love the air force, I think it's the same as saying that I always said, I always wanted my son to join the military organization, but he joined the air force and said, uh, this is one of the pleasures of being a father. And I'll stop being, picking on the middle ranks. The field officers are fine. People lightly sauteed in butter. Delicious.

Meredith Friedman:

So what are the strategies here?

George Friedman:

Okay, well, that's what I'm going to go to right now. Okay. Um, so who the players first is Israel. There's Egypt. They have, Syria has Russia and the United States, both of those countries are deeply involved in this war. Have it imperative, have a requirement that they want from it. That's what made this work so complicated. And from an intelligence point of view, this is where Sadat ran a clinic on Israel, understanding how to use the American and the Russian imperatives. So let's go through these imperatives. Okay. What was the Israeli imperative as Shlomo of an area? My dear teacher puts it. Strategic imperative is everything. Strategic death, death, death. You must have depth. How many times I heard him say to you death, like a religious thing. We take a look at a map of Israel in 1948. Do I have the map, Steve? The map on Israel, I'll go through. Okay. Can I have the next map? One more map, Steve, another map, please. Really good at this. Okay. Thank you. Take a look at ... the previous map. Okay. Could I have the map back? The next one, please. Next one. Steve, can I have the next map? Let's not worry. Okay, stop. Don't move. That's it. Okay. If you take a look at the left hand side, you see the UN partition plan of Israel. If you take a look at the second slide, you see how deeply the Arabs penetrate Israel 1949, you see the pharmacist's line. The strategic imperative of Israel is strategic depth. They must have it. When you take a look at the map as it wasn't 48, you take it to the back and 49. You have to realize that Tel Aviv the Capitol is an artillery range or Arab varmints. Okay? You have to really understand the degree to which the Heartland in Israel, the population center Israel is that risk. It leads to the 1967 war. The 1967 war had a number of points. First seizing the Sinai desert, pushing the Egyptians away from the Southern part of Israel, putting him on the other side of the Suez canal and having that security. Second, it was to take the Western part of Jordan today, the West bank to anchor their line 40, 50 miles to the East on the Jordan river. It's not much of a river, but it's definitely one neighborhood. And the Jordan river line was going to be the other imperatives. Third to take the Golan Heights from which the Syrians were shelling the Galilee region. Okay. And push them out of artillery range. So their goal was first to push. The Arabs are based out of range of these really population.

Speaker 1 ([02:08](#)):

And second in the event of a war have room for maneuver. So it was strategic depth, strategic depth, strategic depth. It actually worked because they screwed up completely and they Egypt didn't penetrate on the other hand. Um, did you, she didn't want to penetrate, but that's another story we'll get to that later. But the Israeli imperative is also to maintain a strategic relationship with an larger industrial country Israel's national security needs at that time, and still are vast vastly outstripped its industrial capability. It has industrial needs that cannot be satisfied internally. And therefore it has to find someone to provide these materials prior to 1967, that relationship was with France. France had a civil war going on with the Arabs in Algeria. France had controlled Syria and lost control of it. Then France was and remains a major influencer of Lebanon, Israel and France had a real common interest. Now they also had fighter planes, tanks, AMX, uh, not necessarily the best in the world, but certainly functional in 1967. The goal abandoned Israel after the war, he said, I told you not to attack. You did. We're done. And the United States came in to support Israel. Why did the United States come in? The primary strategic requirement of the United States was to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean. That was it to do that. They had a containment line. And the key to the containment line in that region was Turkey. Turkey was absolutely critical.

Speaker 1 ([04:29](#)):

Russia tried to destroy the Turkish government and impose a communist government in 1940, a seven, eight, nine 51. It failed it's solution was to leapfrog Turkey. It staged day ties in Syria. It staged coup d'etat in Iraq. By having that position, Turkey was in a position where it could be taxed from two directions, one from the South. If the Soviets built a big enough army for them, and one from the North, they were Nutcracker the American solution. As it moved, as France moved out was to maintain this position and leapfrog leapfrog. One element of that was around the American relationship with Iran, which threatened the RAC, made it impossible for RAC to focus their forces northward. Okay. Uh, forced them to look South. And that's what we wanted. The other one was Siri that had to be dealt with. And Israel did that. Israel created a threat to serious South on the Golan Heights and other places where Syria couldn't even conceive that attack on Turkey was out of the so Russia and the United States were playing a very complex game.

The United States trying to contain the Russians, the Russians, trying to make the containment blind untenable, the Americans coming back and undermining that. And Israel was part of that. The United States never gave weapons to Israel until 1967, except for some Hawks at the air missiles that were given in 1965 when they gave [inaudible] to Saudi Arabia, to, uh, Jordan and also to Israel because they wanted to build an Eddy airline, uh, to block any Soviet intrusions in that direction. And that was the only one. So Israel has two imperatives. One is strategic depth. The other is at a lie like the United States for whom Israel is prepared to carry out unpleasant, but necessarily missions that was then this, that was until the fall of Soviet Union and the game changes. But that was the reason then, and this is why they wanted to go into the Golan Heights.

The Golan Heights, actually it was a pain in the neck. It was not a strategic necessity, but the U S had an EU government there, uh, asides government and asides government was really pro Russian. And we really wanted to give them a black guy. So the imperative of re of Israel was strategic depth, simultaneous with a relationship with a great power. The American intention was to under any circumstances, protect Turkey from Russia intrusion. Okay. And to simultaneously try to control the Mediterranean from Russia and intrusion. Okay. It can all be done. It was complex. So it has to be understood about that war just about every war is there were imperatives that were linked together. The American imperative helped define the Israeli imperative. The Israeli imperative made perfect sense, but the price they had to pay for the weapons to keep it there was to do service to the United States. So yet these two countries at the time, what happened was that the Russians had 56, 57 managed to make an entente with Egypt.

The biggest element of that entente was the gave Russia a Naval base in Alexandria. That's some in Turkey, but as the Alexandria base was the big one. Okay. Do you ask, wanted above all else for there not to be a Naval base in Alexandria because we didn't want to have to mess with them. The sixth fleet Ben was one of the largest fleets we had was the Mediterranean Mediterranean fleet. And we worried, we worried because in 1966, 1966, uh, a Soviet missile called a sticks was fired off of a Digication web. That's not worried about who fired, where okay. And sank. These rarely destroyer a lot. The Russians are always a bit ahead of us on Pete precision guided munitions. So this was a case where they sank the ship. We really wanted the Egyptians out of there. We did not want, they had these, uh, very cold on PT boats, but they were more than that to fire these six missiles. And we didn't want them swarming on us. So our imperative was to get the, get these people, get the Russians out of Egypt. Okay. So each of Israel was cool with that. That's fine. Okay. The interesting thing was that each of also had an imperative of getting the Russians out, but it had to be done in a very particular way. What's Sadat realize it. And that

Nasr didn't is that so long as he remained allied with the Russians, he would never have peace with Israel because the Russians will want them to make war on Israel and keep them tied down in that there was between the 67 war and the 73 war war called, um, was basically a war of attrition. It was called war Patricia and the Russians gave all sorts of money to do it. Who was their idea of this region was why don't you? And he fight while we build our base here and build our political structure there. And we're happy people that that was their strategy. What's the doctor realized. And he was really a brilliant guy. He said, if I keep playing this game, yeah, they're going to give me money. Yeah. They're going to give me weapons. Yeah. I'm going to be constantly beaten by the Israelis one. I needed beat Israel, at least once. And two, I need to get rid of the Russians. Now, the Russians, you this, they were expelled before the war from, uh, from, uh, Egypt. And they really, you know, we're trying very hard to hold onto this. Their strategy against Turkey had failed. Their real card was Egypt and the Naval base and the biggest country in the region, they had Syria that, and the buckle gets you into some way that Iraq and the requisites crazy then as it is now, Egypt was their foundation. So the imperative of Sadat was to get them out. Series imperative was very simple.

Nasr had tried to form United Arab Republic with himself as the head of it. That is old Arab countries in one pie. And I'm going to be president. That is going to be cool. Serious. Nah, I don't think so. I don't think I want this. Okay. And the Syrians position was they wrecked the United Arab Republic. They were kind of outcasts in the Arab world, nothing new there. They couldn't afford Israel to be beaten by Egypt. And they thought Egypt could beat them and not have Syria participate. So it's imperative was not necessarily to beat the Israelis, but to maintain some standing in the Arab world. The ultimate intention of the Egyptians was to expel the Russians and having a relationship with the United States. The Russian intention was to stay. And the American tension was really interesting in may of 1973, Henry Kissinger was visited by two, uh, Arab emissaries emissaries, who they were, I can't possibly know. So I have no idea. And they laid open the idea that we want to expel the Russians. This is a great, but I can't expel the Russians taking away. My military capability never defied the Israelis. You gotta give me a chance to fight the Israelis. Now here's where it gets interesting. The American position was go fight the Israelis, but for domestic political reasons, but also the crucial function that Israel carried out, they couldn't have Israel lose or at least stop lose big time. So the American imperative was that the Israeli should win, but that it wouldn't be a bad idea to have high cover for, uh, Sadat in getting a win. The question of the Golan Heights was important later, but not this first consideration somehow or another. The Egyptians got a red light from the United States and they expelled after this. The Russia advisers now Russia, Egypt was Andi Israeli. Uh, Egypt wanted to think of itself as acting spelling. The Egyptians really meant that they've lost that option. Nasr had to build it. So that had to build an option. And the origin of the work land was to create an option that allowed it to appear that they formed the major victory, but not go so far that these rays have crushed it. In other words, cross the canal do not go to the Golan Heights, not I'm sorry, do not go to the Midland. Judy pass did not pass. Go and do not hit to the Negev desert because you will be cremated on the way there. But give me a victory. Now, what role the Americans played in this? This was Henry Kissinger. So the height of deviousness immediately comes up, but that was the origin from the American side. So we had these imperatives, these rarely imperatives to maintain the strategic compare depth that they had gained in 1973 and maintain their relationship with the United States who provided them during the war was we'll see, they ran 155 millimeter artillery, okay. And they needed a flown in and see fives flew in late, but they flew it in the Israelis had the simply did not have the industrial plant to hold onto the territory they had in the case of a high intensity war. These United States wanted Russia out of the Mediterranean. The Russians wanted to stay in the Mediterranean and they forced this war of attrition that tied the Egyptians down dependent on Russian

weapons until we, so that's the screw this, I mean, I'm not getting anything here. Okay. And so he, these were the imperatives notice. They were in simple, some had multiple levels and there were levels of it that you don't get into. And they were enormously blind, the leak low complex. When you think about it, but it came down to a simple thing. The U S wanted the Russians out of Egypt. Egypt wanted the Russians out, but they couldn't have it until they showed their capabilities. Israel was not about to let them play with their strategic depth. The thing that they really I through repeat over again, that that depth was everything for that. Having the Sinai there taking, uh, and I aside who'd been in power for only three years in a bloody coup, like the Sage he's, his son is still in charge. Uh, Assad had to participate in order to hold his place in this whole mess. Okay. And those were the imperatives and they were complicated. And so anybody who says, okay, Israeli intelligence sucked. Yeah, they did. But take a look at this madhouse of various intentionalities, they had take a look at what they were dealing with, which is why I put intelligence after comparative first, figuring out what the country wants. Then you can deploy your intelligence assets. If you have no idea what they want. If the imperative doesn't tell you what they want, you'll look at everything and nothing.

I mean, you've got to have some guidance of what you're looking at. And so the Israelis wound up in a position where they felt themselves secure. For two reasons. One, they didn't believe that. So that could possibly cross the Suez canal and second, and this, they were right in. And so he does, okay. He's got a long way to go. A long supply line and war. The number one question is when you're driving in there, how do you get the fuel? Because fuel is used to be the rule. I don't always now one gallon, seven pounds multiply seven pounds by. Yeah. And that's a lot of few, how are you going to get it there? And he's really looked at them and said, we've got so many ways to choke off their, um, logistics that they can't really advance, but what's so that new is I don't want advance. Okay. I'm not going to put myself in a position where I have a huge logistical problem, Israeli here. I mean, even if it got mobile, Russian searched air missiles, okay. Uh, I can maneuver through that kind of country. I maintain unit coherence and supply. I'm not going that far. I'm just going to kick some ass on the border, stand there and look cool. I have to do only one thing, something that Israelis think be completely incapable of that. That was the whole strategy. Okay. So, you know, we now get into the intelligence problem. First thing that was missed in significant was the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt. It was misread. It was read as the Russians feeling a finished their mission. There really didn't want to keep their troops there. And this is the Russians wanted them to believe. And the juicers wanted to believe the fact was that the Egyptians expelled them in preparation, where they've gotten a little material, they thought they needed, okay. They did not want the Russians leaking to the Israelis, the Egyptian task, the Russians wanted the Egyptians to have their butts kicked and the Egyptians didn't do it. So before they went and made the plan in may, they visited us. God knows what was said. And they threw the Russians out that gave them five months to bring up a war plan that hopefully was secure for the Russians. The Russians didn't seem to leak it. So they probably didn't know it. But the funny part was the Russians regarded the Israelis as the best thing that ever happened to them because they gave them access in the middle East in various ways. And they wanted, when nothing could be better than expelling me and you lose a war now you're really mean. And he said, that's thrown out of office. And I, you know, we are run from the criminal. So you have all of these imperatives. You have a major event take place. There were a draw of Russian, uh, Russians. And he was the problem. The concept was that the Russians, that the Egyptians were entirely dependent on the Russians and they would never expelled them.

The read they had was that the Russians were, they had done what they could. Uh, Egypt is secure. We have other things to do. They, at that time had to shore up a NATO, which should get slightly tattered on

both sides. Okay. A U S was building up in NATO and have to do that. And that was their rationale, but it was an invitation to attack Israel, please attack, please lose, come begging. And that's what won. So when we talk about the imperatives, okay, this is the mind bending part. Okay. Which is not just in middle East, but in Wars, like old Wars, we fight the imperatives can be defined from intelligence point of view but are complex. Publics want simple explanations. He's evil, we're doing this. And you've got to have a command authority that can metasearch metabolize complexity. Okay. And U S has been pretty good at having that usually. Okay. But this is, was the, the vision, the standpoint of going forward. Now, the next point was, Meredith, when do I stop next?

Meredith Friedman:

Whenever you need a break, I've got questions waiting. Okay. Let's, let's take a couple of questions, um, that were up there from the beginning. And then we'll come back to the intelligence part. I think George is still jet lag from coming back from Korea too. Um, so the attendees Paul, you've got your hand up. Um, if you want to unmute and ask your question, otherwise I can read it. Go ahead. You have to unmute. Nope. Okay. Let me read Paul's question for you. And it's more about the combat side than the, uh, the beginning of your lecture. Did the 1973 war result in increased, launched and recovery times of aircraft from the decks of aircraft carriers.

George Friedman:

I don't know the answer to that. I've never thought of that. Okay. But the no party to the war had aircraft carriers except really the U S uh, I know the U S kept away the carriers as far as possible. I I've never heard anything about that triggering it. It was always the obsession for the Navy, but I don't know that the war had anything.

Meredith Friedman:

Okay. I'm Mark Snyder. I'll go to you. And I don't know if you can unmute ICM mute. Sign's still up there to give it a shot. Nope. And you haven't written, if you want to type it into the Q and a box and I'll read it out for you. There's some problem there, Dave, on the panel, you have your hand up. Why don't you go ahead.

Speaker:

All right. This might sound really dumb, but, uh, so this is a far more complex, uh, reading of the imperatives than I, that I really ever thought of. Did the Egyptians consider what it would mean to March all the way into Televiv and occupied Israeli territory? Am I understanding that correctly?

George Friedman:

Yeah. They never considered that a possibility when they crossed the canal, they refused to go to the Midland Judy passes, which were just a few miles away. Their goal was to stay under the cover of the surface air missiles, the SAM sixes, keeping Egyptian planes away, but there was never any planning or any logistical support for an attempt to go through the passes or anything. At one point in the war, uh, Egypt in general said, you know, it's wide open. Let me go to the MITRE. And Judy, is it? I said, no, that he had no intention of doing that. Um, I always thought of it as an existential war for Israel and only during fundraising time, Jewish appeal always find me how they find me. I don't know. And they're always about to die more hedge funds that I've ever seen. Work contracts in foreign governments for weapons on the road.

Meredith Friedman:

Can we go to Lakey and ask him to ask him ...

Speaker:

Follow up on the same thing, roughly the same, um, um, comment that that would just make my understanding is, and they want, once they cross and gone onto the East bank, they never went any further than two miles off of their depth was two miles. And I just very specific points, um, uh, that they managed to break that the big Sur, what they wanted was to get there and start negotiating, negotiate, negotiate, and negotiate. The United nations is going to come in and negotiate. And what, again, my understanding please, correct me if I'm wrong is to push Israel further away from, from, from that particular line that lump, because Israel is not too close to their populations. So the entire plan was just break through that barrier. Um, hang in there, maybe look cool. I don't know, but, but then start negotiating to say, uh, and ultimately that's what happened, right?

George Friedman:

That's exactly right. As soon as they broke through, and then the Israelis managed to counter attack, cross river and cross the Suez, uh, Henry Kissinger, who is the gray and UN son figure here, uh, proposes, not a ceasefire, but, and negotiate a meeting between the Israeli general and decryption general. This has never happened. Okay. His goal was to get the two of them to shake hands and declare a ceasefire. And it was a place called kilometer one Oh one, which is glomerular one Oh one on the road to Cairo. Okay. It had been at the point that these relays had taken, but the gypsies were not too far away. And they had that agreement. And that was really, you have to understand the stunning nature of this agreement, and this is what Sadat wanted. So that wanted to have a situation in which the world sees Egypt as victorious. Okay. And now he can have a ceasefire and out of that ceasefire kilometer, one Oh one comes camp David, and it can David D Israelis give up the entire Sinai. Now this is what's really important here. It is. Strategic depth, strategic depth. Okay. Do you have it very clear that Egypt is our good friend? And so that makes a incredible move by flying to Jerusalem. Okay. Standing up, we're not going to Vegas. And the last thing that nothing Bagan wanted to do is stand up with him. Okay. And basically over peace. Now it took Jimmy Carter and negotiators of camp David, but Egypt through this maneuver, non-military got back what it could not get militarily to Suez. Israel got an Arab ally. Okay. And the United States is really, it was powerful. The late seventies, Russia suffered a massive reversal okay. In the entire region, right. Syria got screwed, but that's where I got me Syria to get screwed. And this was the latest time that the judge has done this. And when you go down entire line, you can see how the imperatives we begin with. And so that was a genius. He could understand one that he didn't, must've had the Russians too, that he has to defeat the Israelis three is okay. That he suffers the reverse they Corvette. That's not going to make a difference, but now he's got to make the move first move chronometer one Oh one next move, come to Jerusalem and offer peace to Bagan. I had no idea what to do with this.

Merdith Friedman:

Rob, please go ahead and make your comments.

Speaker:

Yeah. This, uh, George has limited goal of the, of Sadat of just, you know, uh, breaching the bar lab line, and then just sitting and waiting for the Israelis to come with their tanks and planes with no infantry support, no artillery support, no combined arms ups. They just went right into the teeth of those sackers

and the, uh, and the, the surface to air missiles and things like that. And so doc got what he wanted. He got the blood, he got, he got a severe bloody nose with the, uh, with the Egypt, the Egyptians give the Israelis a severe bloody nose, went right into their trap. And, uh, you know, we see that, you know, Israel recovered pretty quickly from, uh, you know, they learn lessons real quick from, you know, that they needed suppression of enemy or defenses. They needed all the things that they, that you know, would, uh, uh, you know, keep the, uh, keep the Egyptians from destroying more tanks. I mean, the sag was very interesting cause it's similar to our, uh, dragon, the us dragon.

George Friedman:

No, no, the Sager worked.

Speaker:

Yeah. Yeah, well, I've done it, I've done it. I've done the Dragon. And the dragon, I couldn't, I tried to shoot one of those and I couldn't hit the broad side of a barn, but the wire, when you're guiding it to the target is very difficult to control. Even. I don't know what the Sager's like, but if you can suppress them through artillery or other things that can prevent the, uh, the deployment of the sag or so, but in any event, that's beside the point. I think the thing is, is that, uh, you know, is that I don't think the Israelis knew that Saddam had limited goals here and just simply lured the Israelis into, uh, this kind of, uh, you know, attrition of their tanks through that. So it was just, um, just very interesting the way that Sadat played this, particularly on, in, on the, uh, on this thing, the Suez.

George Friedman:

Because the intelligence part, by the way, when we go on, it was a toe, the toe was our solution. It was a very good solution. Interestingly, for the United States, we lag behind consistently PGM. And then finally now, so, uh ...

Meredith Friedman:

Somebody needs to mute.

George Friedman:

It was, sounded like it was getting strangled. Okay. Um, okay. So we go to the intelligence part now. Okay. And these really had a concept of under what circumstances the Egyptians would go to war. Okay. And they got that cert that from the Egyptians, from a file that had been, and the Egyptians were saying, for real, that two conditions have to be met before we can go to war. First, we have to be able to have air control, to control Aus space above us. And second, we have to have a long range bomber. This got into the hands of Amman, which is military intelligence and Eli's area. And this became the Israeli concept. So this is how the feedback worked. They got Egyptian view, they believed it completely. And they said, there cannot be a war without these two things. Now, one thing that really they missed was why would the Israel Egyptians want long range bombers? If flying in the teeth of Israeli surfaced air missiles, there are no targets within range that are worth hitting with that kind of thing. Why would they want it now? They want it. But the thing they miss the most was this pellet who was commander of the air force could only conceive of air superiority being achieved by fighter planes. And although the fighter planes to answer them, the Russians were pretty good to Soviet is pretty good. They rejected the idea that Egyptian pilots could establish air superiority because three years before they've gotten chewed up and a war of attrition, what they didn't understand was that the Sam six represented a radical shift in what it meant to have air superiority. And the radical shift that it created was you didn't have to control

the air so your aircraft could pass through it. You simply had that airspace, the enemy shouldn't be able to get through ribs. So Israeli intelligence begins with a concept that they never lose, which is that there's going to be no war. And they're backed up in this by the air force. And this general idea that the preconditions of war could not be met on the other side, the mass, my sides, the collection agency Mossad has a source. The source is the Southern law of Nasr. Gama loves his lesser. Now, is he a double? Is he, uh, doing this for money? Is he doing this? Because the doctor is treated badly? Who knows? But he comes across, makes contact in London with the head of Zamir, who is the head of facade. And he says, Egypt is preparing for war and they're going to be going to war. And as the meetings go on to date, get specific. And so we have a source that is predicting a war and the concept, which is saying that they can't be a war. Okay. So you have two different methods of intelligence. One is human intelligence is of course, electronic intelligence as well. I should add this. Amman had tapped into the Egyptian secure system. Special forces had crossed into Israel, into Egypt and tapped into line from which classified information would pass. But it was also feared that if you tap into the live, you may give away that you're there. So it was something that was done only rarely. The rule was only when war is likely to break out. That's when you tap into it. Now we've got catch 23 on this piece of intelligence. If the only time you tap into is when you think of war is going to break out and you don't think war is going to break out, you're not going to hear this war on this line. So you have three pieces, three pieces of intelligence. One is not really intelligence. It's primarily analysis. Who's these rallies have APQ your intelligence system. Mossad is responsible for collection of human intelligence, occasional unpleasant work and collaboration with special operations that may take place.

Amman does analysis. Now, the analysts who worked for a mom were all military men. They may have been in the rotation, but the military was heavily focused on certain type of intelligence. The political intelligence that I laid out, and these imperatives, for example, was not something they did. There was no one there doing political intelligence in the sense of collecting information and trying to understand what this means from a political or a military standpoint, the people under Eli's area followed his lead as commander of intelligence. And that was to believe in the concept till the very end, Mossad captured a source. But as we all know who the hell knows if his sources told him the truth or not, I mean, it's a hell of a thing they're saying, and how can we go out of why would this guy be doing it? And they spend all their time trying to psychoanalyze the source. Okay? You have a technical means of intelligence, but you worry that in utilizing technical means, tell did you destroy detective amazing intelligence? That's true today outside of warfare, too. Okay. Which this is stop cyber, but it's into that kind of warfare. So you have three different models coming. All the people are competent. All the people are good. Zara will not abandon the theory of the model of that. He is not going to abandon the idea that they have to have air superiority before they go. Okay. No matter how much intelligence to the night before it happens. Okay. The night before it happens, he denies the war's coming. The tanks are massing. Radio traffic is all over the place. Egyptian special forces wearing Israeli army boots. Do you think they dumb are traipsing in the sand behind the Bar-Lev line every morning you wake up and you see this, you see all this stuff coming, but there isn't the ability to have air superiority. So it's not going to happen. On the other hand, you have a source that is so beautifully placed. And how can you believe it? I mean, how do you do a sun check on this guy? I've gotten this guy. I mean, tooth, if truth serum existed, that'd be useful, but I'm sure they would have use it if it didn't. But the problem is that Mossad can't get the, the political lead to sign off on the deal. Okay. And the technical means just isn't there. The source, the son in law asked for a meeting in London at the last minute with, um, the head of Mossad. And at this meeting, he says two things today, the war will begin and we'll begin at six o'clock. Now that was very important because if he said at two o'clock, it was Yom Kippur. Everybody was in synagogue that they will or home drinking or

something, but nobody was at work. It was big day off. They could have started mobilizing in the morning by saying six o'clock. They calculated that mobilization, which would go very fast because they were in these places at home. Uh, can wait. They wait out to me. I have always wondered at a guy who knew everything so perfectly and clearly to give the exact time of the attack that was worse for these rallies. So let's do a little paranoid speculation. So that sent him over, said demand a lot of money. Let him know that you hate me and everything else. They go to nowhere attacking some intelligence sources, going to tell them we're coming. The most we can get out of our counter intelligence is that make it wrong. What time's going to happen. That's pure in theory, and that has no value, but it was a beautiful move. If Sendak thought that he was going to be penetrated anyway, there's no way these rallies would not know that this is happening. Okay. So what can I get out of running a false flag? How could I do this? I'll tell them it's six o'clock and at two o'clock that buys me four hours to attack without mobilization. It pushes it into next day. I get a day Syrians get a day. They can push almost down into the Galilee. So the here is, as I say, retrospectively Marsha, Diane, who's a smart guy is hearing this. And he says, you know, all right, now it's true. Six o'clock. I see everything out there. And the concept is often I call them for air superiority. By the way, the first thing that these Israelis do is order airstrikes on the, on the, uh, line. The I'm really tired. I don't don't fly to wreck to Korea. That's a very bad idea. Um,

Meredith Friedman:

Why don't we ask our panel to chip in here.

George Friedman:

I just want to very important I'll stop. They had to go through the source, get out and bomb things, and they were devastated by the Sam AIDS. And it was at that point, they understood what air superiority meant. It didn't necessarily mean yelling Tallyho and Guinea, your fighter plane. It meant being able to deny the enemy, the ability to strike. I think go, sorry.

Meredith Friedman:

Um, Raymond, I'm going to ask you if it's possible to write your question into the Q and a box and then we'll come to you because we're having trouble unmuting some of you, but, uh, Evan, let's go to you and then Fred, uh, on the panel and get your input onto this, uh, section, um, intelligence.

Speaker:

Okay. Um, before I make my point about intelligence, I just want to digress for just a brief moment about, so dots go, no go. Um, in consultation with the Russians about his request for long range bombers, you know, it was a perfectly rational request in the sense that if he did have a long range strike capability, he would bifurcate the role, the necessary role for the Israeli air force to do combat air patrol at home, and also close air support, um, on the front lines. And Israel really wasn't prepared for that. Um, so it was a good call on him, on his, um, I mean maybe Saddam was asking for the same thing, but he decided that he would go anyway because he received scuds, um, scuds and the, uh, in that sort of accomplish the same objective, giving him the courage, I believe to sort of move forward without that, uh, strategic element in his forces. But going back to the intelligence failure, um, sounds all too familiar with recent history after nine 11. I'm sure everybody that's on this call has been thinking about it and what it is real do. They did the same thing that we did. 40 years later, we had a blue ribbon panel and we discussed off, you know, it was failure of imagination, but you know, what I really want to know George is what did that panel conclude? Because looking at it and going through her Zach's book, uh, it's really difficult for me to buy the conundrum that was faced by Diane and my air, um, with the humans,

um, versus the observations on the ground when they made sure they had a good explanation for, um, for the Russian diplomats and their families leaving and Anton 20 twos and enough 20 twos. But they also should have been aware that there had been a lot of material that had been shipped to Damascus into Cairo by the Russians, uh, by air, the black sea was loaded, absolutely loaded with freighters that also had men and material. Um, we knew there were hundreds of thousands. They knew there were hundreds of thousands of trips, uh, behind the, um, Eastern Western bank of the Suez. And the crazy thing was the, um, the buildup of the ramparts that that was seven or eight. Um, the Egyptian ramparts on the seven or eight, um, hardened posts, uh, that the Egyptians had as well as the ramps to breed to go over the, um, the canal, I mean were just grossly misinterpreted. I mean, the ramparts for the Egyptian positions were so high that they could shoot over the Israeli ramparts at the hardened positions to, you know, so they could basically shoot artillery miles into the Suez to attack that limited amount of armor that was already there. These are really, you know, that coupled with the human source, for me, this would have dictated at least a partial mobilization. Um, you didn't necessarily maybe through gained theory on whether or not they were being played with the human source Nasser's son or nephew or whatnot. Um, that only goes so far, but all of the other intelligence on the ground, whether it was interpreted by a non, um, which was populated by former military types that had a certain lens through which they looked at these events or not. Um, it just doesn't add up that it took them this long demobilize. And I'm wondering what, since we really didn't have time to read this or even access, what did the blue ribbon panel say in the aftermath of the war?

George Friedman:

Let me answer in two ways. First, they said, well, on the one hand, on the other hand, and this was absolutely understandable, but at that same time, she'd never, could you speak up a little, basically did what our nine 11 panel did punted, but here's my explanation. The best intelligence analysts are young. They're about 30 to 40 years old. They are not yet in the decision making process. So they're not going to meetings. Their focus is not on the next meeting and things like that. Okay. Also, if they get fired, they have, they have other careers. In other words, they don't have to cap his job and they have to be people who don't need to be liked. What are the characteristics of intelligence analyst. He sees a prick. And by that, I mean, he says what he thinks and live with it. Okay. The Israeli intelligence service was once people like this, okay. You know, one grand old man on top and a bunch of guys, you know, pushing buttons, but the junior guy who didn't already see, okay, the biggest danger of intelligence is, Oh, I saw this before. I just had this discussion. Okay. I saw this before. And therefore it's nothing. No, you saw it before this time. It could be different. I want somebody who can be surprised. I want somebody in the intelligence role who is not blahzay, who doesn't tell me, well, I met on WASA dots and he told me, and he wouldn't lie to me. I want people who are not careerists, who really don't need to be admired by others. In other words, sociopaths but those people can see things Israel's mature. Intelligence service was loaded with careers by careers. That don't mean something bad people who had given their lives to the service. Okay. And in that time, they'd come to certain conclusions and having come to certain conclusions, they knew they were right. They screened out anything else. Not because they were necessarily arrogant. They may have been, but simply because they had derived at a collusion that worked in previous cases and they thought they had the magic key. Okay. And this was what happened with the Israelis at that point 73, I was a young man at that time. And I saw a lot of older people in our intelligence service who had been there since 1948 and who had been very busy and important meetings and all that. And I saw them in other places as well. Um, from my point of view, Mossad was a tired organization, busy collecting information from every clown who came into town. Amman had made the decision on what the world was about 15 years before. Now. Now it's 15 years there. Right?

But there was no one there that they would listen to a young Lieutenant who would tell them guys you're missing it. And they would say to, Oh, we've seen them do this before. And he would lose and would say, well, I haven't seen him do this before, but this is, this is crazy. Now the Agra report blames a era continually. Uh, and probably he was right. That was right. I have no problem. They blamed the use of a concept that way. Uh, they blamed him heavily for not using their, the tap. And pretty much Mossad got off. Okay. After all, they did have a source and they reported him and they defended him. But to me, the problem with intelligence organizations, we had a model of terrorism and that model was Palestinian terrorism, popular front for the liberation of Palestine PLO. So on, we also had seen them operating in Europe, Baader Meinhof, red army brigade, red army fraction. We knew what terrorism was. Okay. And the people who had will grown up in counter terrorism in the seventies and eighties, okay. They come to nine 11, right. And they get intelligence and it tells us is fragmented. And they know that, okay, that isn't sophisticated enough to do this. And they know this and that, this is not how it was done. Well, the best attack comes intelligence. And I think out of what you're not expecting, and your enemy knows what you're expecting allocate, and you, because they've been trained by say, operatives in Afghanistan against the Soviets. So they knew how to think the clock ran. Right? And so I will say that the essential problem with Israeli intelligence and all intelligence organizations is someone who at the age of 30, had a brilliant breakthrough, has now been living on it. It is promoted to a very senior position and can't stop thinking about it as his reference. And that's what happened, uh, here. But as people read military they're military, many of them doing their rotation on intelligence, which is really not where you want to be. Um, they were caught up in a division of reality that had been true before, and they just didn't grasp what happened. So the best intelligence officers in my mind are young, inexperienced, arrogant, looking for a new job, not needing to be liked. And they didn't have anybody like that.

Meredith Friedman:

That's a fascinating description of, well, I won't say who, but a lot of people that we've known who want to be analysts or want to be intelligence analysts. Uh, we've only got about 13 minutes left here, and there's a number of questions in the text box that I'm going to say, we can take those and perhaps do those next time. Um, if we don't get to you, but Lakey, you hands up Fred, um, you're in the car and it was kind of hard to hear you earlier, but if you have, um, a short question or a comment that you can make, and then we'll, we'll get to Lakey again.

Speaker:

Okay. Is that me Meredith?

Meredith Friedman:

Uh, I said Fred, but let's see of the vote. That's okay. Let's see how the sound. Okay. Lakey you go ahead.

Speaker:

Um, very quickly. Um, and in defense of the intelligence and the analyst, uh, community, there is a term that we use it's called group. Think it means it diminishes actually what the much bigger issue. Um, the bigger issue is whatever information you are collecting. You have to see it within a context. You have to see it within a context. What we're talking about here is why wasn't the context itself challenged when information was coming in, it is actually very, very difficult to do that. It's very difficult to, it's very easy to do it. You know, once the event has happened and you moved on and you start, you could start seeing the forest, the trees and whatnot, but it's very difficult to change that sort of paradigm. And we, there is a term that is used in the analytic community and it's called group think. And it's exactly. I think

what George was saying is, um, bit by bit, once a group starts to work, they tend to eventually, um, work the same conclusion, whether necessarily that is the right conclusion or not go to whatever reflects reality accurately or not as a different issue. Uh, but it is something, it is a phenomenon if you will. Um, and it is incredibly difficult to, um, to not fall into it. Um, and you always fall. You always, you can always point out and pointed out after the fact, um, with, if you haven't then the, the, the bad thing hasn't happened, then you never really see it. Anyway. It's a, it's a very difficult thing to do. And as I tried to kind of put things in perspective for also how difficult it is for the analytic, the intelligence and the analytics community.

George Friedman:

Well, there are two things, the people in the field think they understand what they see and they come back with more than just a description of what they've seen, but a hidden analysis. The others are used to working together and nobody likes to work in a high friction environment. So one of the things we work with, we have, what's called a model. We have a model at our company of what the world is going to look like and why it's working this way. And so on has written out every day. We look for information that fits it. Okay. Now the challenge that I have is that yeah. Okay. Yeah. I got, I'm the guy that does the model. Okay. But that's danger and I'm aware of it and to create an environment in which your reward dissent friction. So here's the government. I got to get this report in by next Tuesday. There's a great what you're saying, but we say shove it up and, you know, work on this. The bureaucracy itself runs counter to intelligence analysis, but let's not forget the role of the field operative who thinks he's found gold and has a special weight because he was out in the field and he's really been fed nonsense or found, you know, lost puppy or something like that. So there are many things that make intelligence hard. The only benefit of intelligence is you're poorly paid because that goes on top of everything else. Uh, it's simply, it is an enormously difficult job. I can understand. How has the era made a mistake? I can't forget it, you know, professionally, but I understand what happened, but it should be a lesson to all of interested in that field. You know, being very careful. The problem was that Zaher was a very strong personality and challenging him. Got you seriously, a career in the food service industry. Okay. You're going. And that happens. It's the leader of the group has to be willing to submit to criticism, to other views. I'm not that person, but somebody else might be.

Meredith Friedman:

Okay. I have one last question. I'm actually gonna read this because it's fairly long and it's from Andreas. Um, you explained the word objectives for the 73 war. My question picks up their combat as part of a battle winning the combat is a means to win the battle. Now, the battle is part of the war. You try to win the battle in order to win the war. Here are the two interwoven questions is war itself, part of a larger entity. When the Wars fought for what would be the proper term of that entity, a term that fits for every war. And if you can't think, now we can carry this over to the next session. It's a great question.

George Friedman:

Well, here, we have to think about politics in Aristotle's stores. Politics is not simply watching Trump or by carry on politics is the matter in which human beings live together in a war that entity either seeks the benefit for itself defends itself or what have you. So my answer is when we take a look at the imperatives, when we take a look at, uh, the intelligence. So we take a look at the combat, which we'll get to next time. Okay. The thing to look for is at this moment, a nation state, okay. But it could also be a terrorist group. It is built around the community and within this community, the existence of men or women who are prepared to die for the community, and to me, roar is that community. And on an

individual level, it is the willingness to go in harms way for the community. And if you don't have that, you don't have war, which is good, but you figured they've got a victim. And if you do have that, then you have the ability to move toward greatness in a certain way. But that would be the answer to that. That'd be the element to political, but not in the vulgar sense of the term, in the sense of the highest element of being human, you can have to live outside of the community, the political community. Okay.

Meredith Friedman:

That would be the larger entity than the community that you're fighting for to protect.

George Friedman:

Yeah, each, each age has the city, uh, the church, the, uh, nation state, there are many ways to do it, but as a gathering of the many band together and have something to lose and something to gain and someone who is willing to take the action.

Meredith Friedman:

Okay. Well, I think we're going to end there today. Um, I have those questions copied that we didn't get to on the Q and a box. Uh, Fred, sorry that the volume, the sound wasn't so great from the car. Next time. We'll have you in a stationary place, thanks to Evan, Rob, Dave Lakey, all of those on the panel and, um, for all of you for attending next time, we'll carry on with the second part of the particular war we're looking at as an example, and we'll stop with some of these questions and get into the combat details and try to get some more of your panelists involved in presenting on that as well. Thanks all. Have a great day. And thank you for joining. We'll see you next time. Bye. Bye.

George Friedman:

I'm going to sleep guys.

Meredith Friedman:

I could tell. Thank you. Bye bye.