Years ago, we at GPF predicted that the United States would try to reduce its involvement in the Eastern Hemisphere. Aside from his actions in Iran, President Donald Trump has largely moved in that direction, as in our model any president would. The Eastern Hemisphere must now face a new reality, one with less U.S. involvement and thus one that necessitates new alliances.
Though alliance-making is happening slowly and painfully in Europe, it is taking place more fluidly in Asia. Japan has significantly increased its military power, and Australia is doing likewise, often in collaboration with Japan. Their intent is to be able to defend against potential Chinese attacks without having to rely on the United States. Other nations such as Indonesia, New Zealand and even Vietnam have followed suit. This is a rational response to American disengagement.
Crucially, this process has expanded to India. This month alone, the Japanese prime minister has visited New Delhi, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has visited Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. He reached agreements on economic cooperation and, more importantly, on defense cooperation during each of these visits. Several months ago, the Vietnamese president visited India to discuss similar matters and strengthen existing security ties.
India is largely hostile to China. They have engaged in military conflicts along their border, and tensions have flared over Chinese military aid to Pakistan, India’s archrival. India has also been in economic competition with China. It wants equal economic standing with China but, so far, has been unable to achieve it.
The economic dimension of these agreements between India and Australia, Indonesia, Japan and New Zealand, assuming they evolve, creates a very powerful economic bloc and a potentially powerful military barrier to China’s access to the oceans. That the Philippines, which is still firmly in the U.S. camp, lies between Japan and Australia adds to Chinese obstruction.
From the U.S. point of view, this evolution in Asian relations – again, assuming it evolves – relieves the U.S. from the need to be the primary force containing China. The emerging network would threaten China on land from India and Vietnam and, in theory, impose a naval blockade of sorts. Though the threat to China may never fully materialize, China can’t afford to ignore it.
A new network of alliances would also give Washington more economic leverage over China. China’s economy produces more products than it can domestically consume. It therefore must export massive amounts of its goods to maintain its economic health, and its largest customer is still the United States. The massive economic power of the nations in this potential coalition could be an alternative source for the U.S. to access imports.
Bear in mind that India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, often called simply the Quad, which also includes the U.S., Japan and Australia. This new coalition, which Modi’s recent behavior suggests is looming, is far more significant than the Quad – not only because it has an economic dimension but also because it includes Indonesia, which could further weaken and potentially limit China’s maritime access to Europe and the Middle East. This would make China dependent on a trans-Pacific route through the Panama Canal or around South America.
It’s possible none of this happens, of course. But sometimes change comes slowly, so Modi’s Asia tour could be seen as the beginning of a fundamental shift in the global system – which all the nations he has met with will have an interest in. But if it happens, the fundamental question will be whether Europe, another region impacted by the new U.S. geopolitical strategy, evolves as well. Either way, what Modi seems to have achieved is a historical event.
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