The Ukrainian military has been attacking Russian energy infrastructure for some time now, so last week’s drone strikes against oil refineries and storage tanks, including one in Moscow, are better seen as the escalation of a longer campaign than as a change in Ukraine’s strategy in the war. It goes without saying that oil is still essential to the Russian economy and the war effort. The point of the attacks, then, was to show that Kyiv can limit the amount of money Russia can make from selling oil at a time when there is a global shortage.
Russia, meanwhile, has ramped up its drone attacks on Ukraine, systematically hitting valuable targets throughout the country. But whereas Ukraine’s attacks open up new possibilities, Russia’s attacks are, to an extent, more of the same, so it’s unclear whether it can escalate more than it already has. Ukraine’s strikes also seem more strategically impactful.
Russian leaders have said publicly that they held meetings to discuss a response. The publicity surrounding the meetings suggests the seriousness of the situation. Russia knows it must find a way to change its strategy. Over the past few days, leaders there have signaled publicly that whatever political “understanding” emerged from the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska last August has weakened or collapsed. I have seen no significant shift in either Russian strategy or American response after the Anchorage meeting, so it’s possible it never amounted to much at all.
Moscow has hinted that it could ask Belarus to get involved in the war. Tellingly, talks between Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko ended Sunday in Moscow. Lukashenko owes his presidency to Russia, which intervened on his behalf when pressure mounted against his re-election campaign. So far, he has declined to get directly involved in Ukraine. It’s easy to see why. Belarus has limited military capabilities, so it’s unclear whether attacking Ukraine from the east would end well. More, Russia needs Belarus as a client state, and if Belarus is forced into war, it’s possible the anti-Lukashenko factions could re-emerge with a new rallying cry. Both the Russian and the Belarusian militaries would likely be spread too thin to stop them. Any diversion of forces to pacify Belarus would be dangerous for Russia.
It’s possible, and even probable, that Putin has asked Lukashenko to allow Russian forces into Belarus to attack Ukraine on another front. There seems to be no other reason for Lukashenko to travel to Moscow, at least not now and not under these circumstances.
Even if this is the case, and even if Belarus accedes, it’s also unclear how effective the strategy would be. Russian troops in Belarus would be vulnerable to drone strikes if massed and readily repelled by a much more experienced Ukrainian army. Given that Putin has not tried to force the issue to this point, it appears that he and his advisers understand all this.
Even so, it’s difficult to think of another reason for Lukashenko’s summons. I will assume that the meetings of senior officials in Moscow focused on what should be done, not on massive new attacks on Ukraine or the future of Putin’s leadership. I can’t imagine the talks were about bringing peace because Lukashenko’s presence in Moscow would not be needed for that. This says to me that the attacks on the refineries have forced Putin into a very difficult position.
It’s clear that the attacks pose a fundamental threat to Russia’s economy and military, and they took place while Russia is attacking Ukraine with drones and has the technical ability to counter drones. If there are not enough anti-drone systems to defend the refineries, then Russia faces a crisis and is searching for a solution. The fundamental question is whether there is a solution available.
America in Transition & The Geopolitics of the American President